DARPA wants to stop biothreats before they spread

Published 30 June 2009

DARPA is looking to accelerate the response to pathogens, stopping the bugs before they even start; the goal: persistent, universal immunity by speeding up long-term resistance to new and unknown pathogens

Viruses are spreading faster than ever — it took the Swine Flu less than a month to infect more 1,800 people in 72 countries. According to the World Health organization (WHO), the number of infected people has now reached 60,000. The Pentagon, therefore, is looking to accelerate the response to pathogens, stopping the bugs before they even start. DARPA — who else? — is soliciting proposals for a four-step program to stop bio-threats before they spread, and eventually prevent infection entirely. Time line: Seven days.

Katie Drummond writes that infectious microorganisms are on the rise, and it is not just terrorist threats we should be wary of. DARPA is worried about bio-sabotage, and then there is the potential loss of closely guarded pathogens, like what happened at Fort Detrick, the Army’s main biodefense lab, in April. Much of the new risk, though, comes down to man vs. nature:

Examples of factors implicated in the increase in new, emerging and re-emerging pathogens include: increased animal-human interface; increased population densities and co-location of vulnerable species with pathogen reservoirs; climate change, particularly affecting migration and spread of vectors; and narrowing of genetic diversity among food animal stocks.

Right now, influenza management starts with quarantine. Then, scientists try to identify the pathogen and develop and distribute a vaccine. Drummond writes that DARPA warns of potential 14-year lag times to subdue especially potent strains. That has not happened yet, but the military is worried it could, “in cases where the pathogen is unknown or difficult to characterize.”

DARPA hopes to prevent primary infection altogether. They are not talking Purell kiosks at every airport. Rather, DARPA wants “biomedical intervention” that can immediately immunize at-risk personnel or quickly kill the virus. If it is too late for that, phase two — “sustaining survival” — would interfere with viral pathways or use “pathogen competitive microorganisms” to keep an infected person alive.

Drummond notes that phase three is where things get interesting. If someone is already infected, DARPA wants to take advantage of their antibodies, transplanting them into the uninfected population to promote immunity and minimize the risk of widespread outbreak. Also, they want vaccines of “universal immunity donor cells” that can be readily available.

Phases one through three will be irrelevant if DARPA can succeed at phase four: persistent, universal immunity. The goal is to speed up long-term resistance to new and unknown pathogens. Right now, it can take 6-18 months for a vaccine to be effective. DARPA expects new research to show one-week, 95 percent immunity in animal tests.

Drummond notes that the advances would likely transform global response to the next H1N1 — but, for now, the Pentagon’s mostly watching their own back:

No group is at greater risk of exposure to new international pathogens, to bio-sabotage of food supply lines, or of attack from biological threat agents, then the U. S. Military.