U.S. electric power grid “inherently vulnerable” to terrorist attacks: report
in the United States, and the delivery time for new ones could run from months to years. A promising solution, the report says, is to develop, manufacture, and stockpile a family of universal recovery transformers that would be smaller and easier to move. They would be less efficient than those normally operated and would only be for temporary use, but they could drastically reduce delays in restoring disabled electric power systems. In line with this recommendation, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has recently cooperated with the U.S. power industry on the RecX program to develop and test a recovery transformer.
There are also critical systems — communications, sensors, and controls — that are potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks, whether through Internet connections or by direct penetration at remote sites. Any telecommunication link that is even partially outside the control of the system operators could be an insecure pathway into operations and a threat to the grid. Cyber security is best when connections with the outside world are eliminated, the report says. When interconnections are unavoidable, high-quality technical and managerial security systems should be in place, including systems that monitor for and help avoid operator error or intentional sabotage.
The report states that although it is not reasonable to expect federal support for all local and regional planning efforts, DHS and/or the U.S. Department of Energy should initiate and fund several model demonstration assessments across cities, counties, and states. These assessments should systematically examine a region’s vulnerability to extended power outages and develop cost-effective strategies that can be adopted to reduce or eventually eliminate such vulnerabilities.
Building on the results of these model assessments, DHS should develop, test, and disseminate guidelines and tools to assist other cities, counties, states, and regions to conduct their own assessments and develop plans to reduce vulnerabilities to extended power outages. To facilitate these activities, public policy and legal barriers to communication and collaborative planning will need to be addressed.
The release notes that this report was completed by the National Research Council in the fall of 2007, but the sponsoring agency, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, decided at that time that the report would be classified in its entirety. After a formal request from the Research Council for an updated security classification review, the report was cleared for public release in fall 2012. A foreword to the report, written by Ralph Cicerone, president of the National Academy of Sciences, and Charles Vest, president of the National Academy of Engineering, provides details about the delay and says that the key findings of the report remain “highly relevant.” The foreword states:
“We regret the long delay in approving this report for public release. We understand the need to safeguard security information that may need to remain classified. But openness is also required to accelerate the progress with current technology and implementation of research and development of new technology to better protect the nation from terrorism and other threats.”
Concurrent with the report’s release to the public, a workshop is being planned to address changes that have occurred since the report’s completion in 2007 and where future efforts should be directed to improve grid resilience.
The study was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
— Read more in Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System (National Research Council, 2012)
