Enhancing Army capabilities as new threats emerge

leaders. The immediate goal should be to lower the response time from fifty-five to something much less, for example, twenty-eight days, said an Army general.

To obtain faster response times to crises and improve its strategic and operational maneuver posture, the Army is conducting a comprehensive review “across the DOTMLPF,” said Walker. DOTMLPF is a term the Army uses to describe “doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities.”

The problem of moving troops quickly to an area is not solely an Army problem. “It’s a joint mission” imperative said Maj. Gen. Bill Hix, TRADOC’s director of the Concepts Development and Learning Directorate, during the roundtable. Multinational partner coordination is also essential, he added.

Participants said the war game demonstrated the difficulties with strategic maneuver without adequate intermediate staging bases, especially as the Army becomes increasingly U.S.-based. Proposed solutions included prepositioning supplies on ships or ashore in distant places, and partnering with allied capabilities.

Entry-level problems
The war game also illustrated problems once Soldiers arrive – specifically, the so-called “anti-access/area denial” challenge.

“We saw the brittleness of our ability to defeat projected 2020 anti-access/area-denial challenges of potential adversaries during the game as units became isolated and some withdrew,” said Col. Kevin M. Felix, TRADOC’s chief of the Future Warfare Division, during the roundtable. “We got some forces in but there were problems with the build-up of follow-on forces and sustainment.”

The enemy already knows which ports and airfields the United States would rely on in a crisis and would target those, said participants.

Even without the enemy targeting key entry facilities, there could still be challenges getting troops and supplies in, Felix said, illustrating the problems faced by U.S. forces in providing post-earthquake humanitarian assistance to Haiti in 2010 due to competing demands for priority for slot times for landing arriving combat forces and humanitarian aid support/supplies.

“If you can’t get there quickly to achieve the desired effects, you lose (U.S. and global) support quickly,” Felix said, referring not only to humanitarian operations, but also to the loose nuke scenario.

Masses of refugees could also hinder access, Hix said. He noted that during the war game, the refugee situation was resolved somewhat by setting up a humanitarian staging area away from the area of operations and encouraging the locals to go there by air dropping leaflets with instructions.

Another lesson learned from the war game is that the U.S. forces cannot always go it alone. Rather, the United States needs to continue to build partnerships and regional engagement with other countries and their militaries, Hix said.

He added that the Army should also continue to “leverage its other capabilities, like special operations forces” and use those of its sister services.

“The good news story over the last decade has been the participation of the Guard and Reserve in partnering” with the active component, said Cone. “They have expressed the desire to remain part of the operational force and have demonstrated their performance” in war.

“(The Guard and Reserve have also) provided an array of talent,” he continued. Going forward, “we have to find the best ways to train and integrate them with the active component.”

Lesson learned
Over the last decade of war, the United States has learned the importance of the human domain, said Cone. Building personal relationships and learning host-nation culture, language and customs have been shown to yield dividends.

Underestimating the enemy’s “will to win,” or at least not lose, can be a big mistake, Cone said, providing one of the many examples from history:

“We collapsed Iraq’s command and control and then its ability to conduct operations, but that didn’t stop them from finding alternative ways to wage war,” he said, referring to the insurgents’ use of roadside bombs, other forms of terrorism and effective propaganda.

Although the United States dominated on the battlefields of Iraq and now Afghanistan, in terms of firepower and technology “their will was still there,” he said. “While technology is critical, war comes down to a human struggle.”

Despite IEDs and other unconventional threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, soldiers were able to adapt and overcome those and other obstacles, Walker said, noting that Soldiers helped to come up with counter IED tactics, materiel solutions, jammers, and improved vehicle armor.

Walker attributed Soldiers’ ingenuity to top-notch training, education and leadership development programs. Walker said he hopes the lessons learned from the wars and the professionalism demonstrated by Soldiers will continue.