SyriaThe two-track Syria strategy of Iran and Hezbollah

Published 6 June 2013

For Iran and Hezbollah, the preservation of Bashar Assad regime is of supreme strategic importance, but both realize the regime may not survive. Iran and Hezbollah, therefore, employ two parallel strategic tracks. The first, immediate track aims to prop up the Assad regime’s ability to survive and continue governing by providing it with military, economic, political, and propaganda support. The second track, planned as an intermediate- and long-term strategy, aims to make it possible for Syria’s Shi’ites and Alawites to defend themselves by creating a “popular army.” To help the first track, Hezbollah has sent thousands of its best fighters to fight on the side of the Assad regime and help the regime keep its hold over areas in northwest Syria. To advance the second track, Hezbollah, with Iranian funding, is helping the Assad regime build and train a popular army of about 150,000 Alawite and Shi’a soldiers. This army will protect the interests of the Alawite and Shi’a communities – and the interests of Iran and Hezbollah — in Syria if the Assad regime falls.

Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi’ia group, has sent thousands of its best fighters to fight on the side of the Assad regime, and has helped the regime keep its hold over areas in northwest Syria. Several hundred Hezbollah fighters have already died in the fighting.

Hezbollah, with Iranian funding, is also helping the Assad regime build and train a “popular army” of about 150,000 Alawite and Shi’a soldiers. This army will be assigned to protect the interests of the Alawite and Shi’a communities – and the interests of Iran and Hezbollah — in Syria if the Assad regime falls.

These are some of the findings of a new report from the Tel Aviv-based Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

While Hezbollah has sent thousands of its best soldiers to fight alongside the Syrian army, Iran’s support for the regime has been mainly financial and logistical. In late April, Syrian central bank governor Adib Mayaleh told Reuters that Iran had extended a $1 billion credit line to Syria, and that Damascus was near agreement with Russia and Iran on more funding.

The Meir Amit Center says Iranian transport planes carry arms to Syria, mainly through Iraqi airspace. Some planes land at the Beirut airport before the arms they carry are transferred, on land, to the Assad regime.

The Meir Amit Center says that the Revolutionary Guards’ presence in Syria is small, and that the group is rarely involved in the fighting.

The report’s main conclusions:

1. For Iran and Hezbollah, the preservation of Bashar Assad’s regime is of supreme strategic importance. Syria is Iran’s most important ally in the “resistance camp” (resistance, that is, to the United States and Israel), providing Iran with a firm foothold in the heart of the Middle East, as well as political and military influence. Syria also plays a vital role in Hezbollah’s military buildup, helping the organization build offensive and deterrent capabilities against Israel. For Iran and Hezbollah, the fall of the Syrian regime would be a disaster. It would weaken Iran’s regional position against the United States and Israel and damage Hezbollah’s military capabilities and political influence in Lebanon.