CounterinsurgencySticks over carrots: the rationale of Assad’s counterinsurgency “madness”
Counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts by the West, particularly over the past decade, have emphasized the limitation of violence and the importance of the local population. Western COIN practice focuses on establishing the perception of state legitimacy in the area around which the insurgency is taking place. The objective is to sway influence away from the insurgents and towards the regime by providing security, services, stability and growth. By contrast, Syrian efforts in counterinsurgency have not only avoided securing the civilian population, but have actively targeted it. Whereas Western COIN prioritizes “the people,” the Syrian strategy focuses on the elimination of the militant opposition regardless of the collateral violence. Assad’s “enemy-centric” approaches to counterinsurgency utilizes intense violence — targeting of refugees, schools, hospitals, and using chemical weapons — to divide public support from the insurgency by punishing the civil population.
Syrian government shows disregard for civilian noncombatants // Source: alalam.ir
The Syrian civil war is in its thirty-first month and shows few signs of abating. The death toll is now estimated at over 115,000, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
Understanding this level of violence isn’t easy. The Assad regime has relentlessly bombarded civilians, schools and hospitals: targets seemingly far removed from the militant opposition. But while such a flagrant disregard for human rights may incense global observers, it is grounded in the calculated logic of “enemy-centric” counterinsurgency (COIN), with clear and definable objectives based on historical precedent.
The role of violence in Western COIN
Counterinsurgency efforts by the West, particularly over the past decade, have emphasized the limitation of violence and the importance of the local population. FM3-24, the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency manual, stresses this point in doctrine. For those executing this framework, COIN practice focuses on establishing the perception of state legitimacy in the area around which the insurgency is taking place.
The objective is to sway influence away from the insurgents and towards the regime by providing security, services, stability and growth. This gives a greater incentive for the target audience to side with the state, as it can provide a better deal than its insurgent alternatives.
In this form of counterinsurgency, violence plays a supplementary role. Human security (patrols, guard duty), policing, targeted killings and raids are its optimum form. The aim is to build the capabilities of the local government, while systematically degrading the insurgency’s ability to provide a viable alternative to that same authority.
By design, this “population-centric” approach to COIN tends to abhor excessive displays of force and intimidation. Such acts run counter to the overall effort, destroying trust and undermining confidence within the target population. But while needless harm and terror is heavily dissuaded in western counterinsurgency theory, prolific incidents have continued to occur.
Ultimately, however, these discrepancies remain as distant to normal practice, and importantly are not state-sanctioned.
Syrian (and Russian) approaches
By contrast, Syrian efforts in counterinsurgency have not only avoided securing the civilian population, but have actively targeted it. Whereas Western COIN prioritizes “the people,” the Syrian strategy focuses on the elimination of the militant opposition regardless of the collateral violence.
“Enemy-centric” approaches to counterinsurgency are nothing new, and follow their own logic to rationalize their prioritization of violence.
