ISISObama to outline a comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS

Published 10 September 2014

President Barack Obama this evening will give a televised address from the White House in which he will unveil a “comprehensive strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy” Islamic State (ISIS) Islamist insurgents. A White House official said the strategy would include military action by the United States and support for local forces to fight ISIS on the ground. These forces will include the moderate opposition in Syria; a new, inclusive Iraqi government; and U.S.-style provincial National Guards-like units in Iraq which will be governed by Iraqi provincial leaders rather than the central government in Baghdad. The thorniest problem the new strategy will have to overcome is whether and how to conduct military operations in Syria – and the ultimate purpose of these operations.

 

President Barack Obama this evening will give a televised address from the White House in which he will unveil a “comprehensive strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy” Islamic State (ISIS) Islamist insurgents.

A White House official said the strategy would include military action by the United States and support for local forces to fight ISIS on the ground. These forces will include the moderate opposition in Syria; a new, inclusive Iraqi government; and U.S.-style provincial National Guards-like units in Iraq which will be governed by Iraqi provincial leaders rather than the central government in Baghdad.

The president will discuss how we are building a coalition of allies and partners in the region and in the broader international community to support our efforts, and will talk about how we work with the Congress as a partner in these efforts,” the White House official said.

The Guardian reports that ahead of Obama’s address, Secretary of State John Kerry was holding urgent talks in Baghdad with the new Iraqi prime minister. One of Kerry’s goals in the talks is to persuade Haider al-Abadi, the new Iraqi prime minister, to cede more power to the Sunni minority to bring them on side. As they did in 2006, the Sunni tribes in Anbar Province earlier this year threw their support behind ISIS as a result of the policies of the previous prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, who systematically excluded Sunni from power in Iraq. In 2007, with thousands of U.S. troops still in Iraq, the United States was able to do three things: Lean on Maliki to change his policies of exclusion; persuade the Sunni tribesman that they would have a say in Iraq’s future; and put together an effective military campaign on the ground, in close coordination with the Sunni tribes, to evict Al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS precursor, from Anbar Province.

This time the situation is different. The United States has no meaningful military presence in Iraq, and the Sunni tribes will take more persuasion to trust a Shi’a-led government in Baghdad yet again. As importantly, all the fighting on the ground will have to be done by Iraqis this time.

These difficulties notwithstanding, the collaboration of the Sunni tribes in the fight against ISIS is essential, so the United States is aware that it must persuade al-Abadi, a Shi’a, to follow through on pledges to give Sunnis more regional authority and greater control over security forces.