TerrorismTerrorists develop tactics to evade U.S. drones

Published 9 January 2015

The CIA’s use of Predator drones against Islamic militants in the Middle East began shortly after the 9/11 attacks and has increased dramatically during the Obama administration. As the number of drone strikes in Yemen increased, AQAP militants began to develop tactics to hide themselves from a drone’s sensors.

The CIA’s use of Predator drones against Islamic militants in the Middle East began shortly after the 9/11 attacks and has increased dramatically during the Obama administration. Only a handful of drone strikes were issued through much of the 2000s, but in 2012 alone, forty-one strikes were aimed at Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), followed by twenty-six in 2013 and twenty-three in 2014, according to the Longwar Journal. Many of these strikes have killed high valued targets including the first major strike in 2002 which killed Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harthi, and five other militants as they rode in a jeep across the desert. Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born cleric who recruited militants across the world to join al-Qaeda in Yemen, was also killed in a drone strike in 2011.

As president the number of drone strikes in Yemen increased, AQAP militants began to develop tactics to hide themselves from a drone’s sensors.

In a recent AQAP video posted on social media sites, militants describe how fighters can avoid detection by U.S. drones. According to the Washington Times, the video, “Combating Spy Airplanes” shows a step-by-step process for making and using an aluminum-based portable body wrap which it claims will prevent the drone’s infrared cameras from detecting a human’s heat signature. “The aluminum is supposed to act like a heart barrier, keeping the fighter’s body heat from being detected by the drone camera system,” read an analysis by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). A camouflage version of the wrap is said to help hide fighters from the drones during the day.

Whether AQAP’s body wrap is actually effective is unclear, but the idea of it shows how militants are studying U.S. military tactics, and then countering them. The homemade AQAP instructional video uses clips from the Pentagon’s official video of the Predator drone. A spokesman for U.S. Central Command, which conducts military operations in Yemen, said “For operational security reasons, we wouldn’t discuss the possible effectiveness or ineffectiveness of specific enemy (tactics, techniques and procedures) nor would we speculate on how they derive their information.”

Some military analysts question the gains made by U.S. efforts in Yemen. They claim AQAP is controlling more territory now than before. “Our long drone war against AQAP has been remarkably ineffective,” said Robert Spencer, who heads Jihad Watch. “Awlaki was killed, but AQAP now controls much of Yemen and acts at will there. They are clearly not cowed, not afraid, not on the defensive.”

Others believe that the need for terrorists to produce videos promoting tactics for countering drones means that the Predator strikes are effective. “One part of their military strategy is to distribute videos and information to followers online, particularly via Twitter and YouTube, showing that they are actively engaged in countering the impact drones have had on their capabilities,” said Steven Stalinsky, executive director of MEMRI.