ISISWhy the fight against Islamic State is not the success we’re told it is
Ministers from twenty-one countries gathered in London on January 22 to discuss the fight against Islamic State (IS). They had their photo opportunity and issued their statements. US secretary of state, John Kerry, told them that almost 6,000 jihadists had been killed, and almost 700 square kilometers of Iraqi territory retaken. But at the end of the day, all of this had precious little to do with the issue of how to confront IS’s political, military, and social expansion. There are alternatives that could really challenge the IS: an Iraqi Kurdistan with real international recognition and support, an Iraqi government answering to all communities, a Syrian opposition supported in a political vision that overcomes not only the jihadists but the Assad regime. But the London summit proved these things are still out of reach — or at least too much for the allies to openly contemplate.
Ministers from twenty-one countries gathered in London on January 22 to discuss the fight against Islamic State (IS). They had their photo opportunity and issued their statements. US secretary of state, John Kerry, told them that almost 6,000 jihadists had been killed, and almost 700 square kilometers of Iraqi territory retaken.
But at the end of the day, all of this had precious little to do with the issue of how to confront IS’s political, military, and social expansion.
None of the officials from the twenty-one countries would state the obvious: without a determined strategy to challenge IS on the ground as well as from the air in Syria and in Iraq, the best that can be achieved is “containment” of the jihadists.
And none acknowledged that, without a long-term approach to deal with deep-set political grievances in both countries, IS will continue to appeal to — and recruit — many more people.
Credit where it’s due
The U.S.-led aerial intervention in Iraq, which began in August 2014, has certainly checked IS’s advance. It bolstered Kurdish forces as IS neared the Iraqi Kurdistan capital of Erbil; it has helped those same forces retake some key positions, such as the Mosul Dam, and recapturing some areas of north-west Iraq.
However, the Iraqi military’s success in the east, west, and south after its near-collapse in summer 2014 owes more to Iranian support and the rise of Shia militias than to any American efforts.
At best, Washington has tacitly accepted that Baghdad’s security depends more on Tehran and the Shia groups than on U.S. strategy. Kerry’s boast about the thousands of IS bodies — almost half of the estimated jihadist force — was a simple attempt to kick dust over this reality. Indeed, even before the statement was made, U.S. defense secretary, Chuck Hagel, was trying to temper it: “I was in a war [in Vietnam] where we did body counts and we lost that one.”
