SyriaWhy Putin gambled on airstrikes in Syria – and what might come next
The real story of Moscow’s gamble in Syria emerges from an analysis of the targets the Russian planes have hit so far: all but one of these targets were in areas held by the opposition to Syria’s Assad regime, rather than by the Islamic State’s militants. The Russian military intervention in Syria is thus part of a high-stakes bet that with brazen propaganda, political maneuvers and airstrikes, Russia can save Syria’s embattled president, Bashar al-Assad, from a likely downfall. This gamble is not likely to succeed. Moscow’s warplanes can help the Syrian military keep a hold on its vital defense line, which runs from the Mediterranean to Homs and then to Damascus. But just as the Syrian Air Force has not been able to help Assad’s ground forces reclaim lost territory, Russia’s jet fighters cannot wage a front-line battle against the rebels. With no prospect of a revitalized Syrian Army, Putin is left with two unpalatable options: to either deploy Russian troops on the battlefield or accept the de facto partition of Syria — allowing the rebels to hold their positions in north-west and southern Syria. Putin can hope that Saudi Arabia finally gives way and joins the Americans and the Europeans to support Assad on a temporary basis. If that happens, Putin will have won his bet. But if the Saudis remain intransigent and the Americans’ mood turns sour, his losses could be dire indeed.
For those watching closely, the signal for Russia’s first airstrikes came in a statement early on 30 September by Kremlin spokesman Sergei Ivanov, just after the upper house of the parliament authorized military operations:
To observe international law, one of two conditions has to be met – either a UN Security Council resolution or a request by a country, on the territory of which an airstrike is delivered, about military assistance.
In this respect, I want to inform you that the president of the Syrian Arab Republic has addressed the leadership of our country with a request of military assistance.
Within hours, witnesses were reporting that Russian jet fighters were bombing parts of Hama and Homs Provinces in western Syria. Activists said scores of people — almost all civilians — had been killed, disseminating videos and photographs of slain or injured children.
Putin called the airstrikes a “pre-emptive” operation against the Islamic State — the official reason for Moscow’s military escalation inside Syria. The Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said that “rumors that the targets of these strikes were not IS positions were groundless”. The defense ministry, reporting twenty sorties on eight sites, released video of a supposed attack on an Islamic State headquarters.
But even before the Russian leaders set out their line, witnesses and analysts had confirmed — through videos and geolocation as well as testimony — the real story of Moscow’s gamble: all but one of the targets were areas held by the opposition to Syria’s Assad regime, rather than by the Islamic State’s militants.
Of course, Putin and Lavrov probably knew that their obfuscation would soon be exposed. It was all part of a high-stakes bet that with brazen propaganda, political maneuvers and airstrikes, Russia can save Syria’s embattled president, Bashar al-Assad, from a likely downfall.
Putin’s gamble
Only six weeks before these strikes began, Russia’s efforts to save Assad were floundering. Working with Iran, Moscow had hoped to convince foreign powers to let Assad stay in power during a political “transition”. The United States had appeared receptive, and John Kerry discussed the possibility with Lavrov in early August.
But the Saudi foreign minister torpedoed the initiative, humiliating Lavrov at a press conference after their meeting in Moscow by insisting Assad relinquish power before any negotiations begin.
