Terrorists & technologyNon-state actors exploiting emerging technologies, complex engineering

In a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Security, START experts explore the threat of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) exploiting emerging technologies and executing complex engineering operations to facilitate their violent and criminal activities. The special issue of the journal, Designing Danger: Complex Engineering by Violent Non-State Actors, presents the results of a series of case studies of VNSAs and their attempts to increase their capabilities through engaging in sophisticated engineering efforts.

START reports that the cases studied include:

• The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the development of advanced mortar systems;
• Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical and nuclear weapons programs;
• The production of submersibles and submarines by FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia);
• The Zetas transnational criminal organization’s construction and maintenance of an expansive radio communication network across Mexico;
• Hamas and the construction of attack tunnel networks from Gaza into Israel; and
• A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network.

“These case studies have provided several insights into the decision, implementation and outcomes of engineering efforts undertaken by violent non-state actors,” said Dr. Gary Ackerman, director of START’s Unconventional Weapons and Technology (UWT) division. “Despite being forced to operate clandestinely and facing the pressures of security forces seeking to hunt them down and neutralize them, at least a subset of VNSAs have shown themselves to be capable of some genuinely impressive feats of engineering.”

In his article, “Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts,” Ackerman discusses broader findings across the entire series of case studies, offering a set of hypotheses and potential indicators that can contribute to operational and strategic intelligence assessments.

“If our hypotheses are confirmed by further investigation, many of them can be directly employed as observable indicators to show when a VNSA has the intent to engage in, or is already engaging in, complex engineering efforts,” Ackerman said.

Among the most useful of the potential observable indicators: complex engineering efforts become most likely in situations where there have been changes to a VNSA’s strategic or tactical environment for which the group is not able to compensate with existing technologies and where the group is prevented from externally acquiring the necessary technology. This was arguably a key driver in the cases of the PIRA, FARC, and Los Zetas.

START notes that the case studies also showed that the structure and characteristics of a VNSA likely contribute to its pursuit of and success with complex engineering efforts. Further research might confirm that the VNSAs that are most likely to pursue and succeed in complex engineering efforts are those which: (1) have a penchant for taking risks; (2) are willing and able to devote substantial resources to the effort for an extended period of time; (3) can conduct R&D through a specialized organ in a location of relative security; (4) tend to persevere in the face of setbacks; and (5) either already have, or can relatively easily acquire, the necessary expertise.

— Read more in Journal of Strategic Security 9, no. 1 (Spring 2016), Special Issue: Designing Danger: Complex Engineering by Violent Non-State Actors