European securityBrexit will not weaken European security: Expert

Published 21 June 2016

On Thursday U.K. citizens will vote in a referendum on whether Britain should remain a member of the European Union or exit the EU (“Brexit”). The most recent polls show a slight advantage for the “Remain” campaign, but pollsters say the vote is too close to call. Some security experts have argued that British exit from the EU would weaken Britain’s – and Europe’s – capabilities in the fight against terrorism, but Thorsten Benner, the director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, disagrees. He argues that it is unlikely we will see a fundamental weakening of European security should U.K. voters choose to leave the European Union.

Europe watching the result of the U.K.'s "Brexit" vote // Source: theconersation.com

On Thursday U.K. citizens will vote in a referendum on whether Britain should remain a member of the European Union or exit the EU (“Brexit”). The most recent polls show a slight advantage for the “Remain” campaign, but pollsters say the vote is too close to call. Some security experts have argued that British exit from the EU would weaken Britain’s – and Europe’s – capabilities in the fight against terrorism (see “Britain’s exit from the EU would necessitate review of British defense posture: Expert,” HSNW, 3 June 2016; “U.K. exit from the EU would weaken the West in the war on terror: David Petraeus,” HSNW, 28 March 2016; “U.K. could lose access to terrorism, crime databases if it leaves the EU: Europol,” HSNW, 24 March 2016).

Thorsten Benner, the director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, disagrees. He argues that it is unlikely we will see a fundamental weakening of European security should U.K. voters choose to leave the European Union. “A Brexit is unlikely to derail the nascent improvements in European security and defense cooperation prompted by new threats and budgetary pressures,” he writes in DW.

Populist movements across the continent may well feel emboldened by Brexit, but a British departure is unlikely to weaken European security because too many countervailing forces are at work.

The logic of security cooperation post-Brexit is very different from the economic and finance logic. For the remaining EU member-states, it makes sense to make Brexit painful for the British economy and the City of London — both for gaining business for themselves and also as a deterrence to other member-states considering leaving the EU.

It may well be the case that on the economic front, “out is out,” as the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has said. But when it comes to security, this logic does not apply, Benner says.

Britain has excellent military, police, and intelligence assets, and European countries know they will be stronger if they continue as close a security cooperation as possible with the United Kingdom. This is why “out is not out” when it comes to security.

“Cooperation of the intelligence services will continue. And Europol and the rest of the EU apparatus will find pragmatic bridging arrangements with the United Kingdom in order to continue close collaboration on fighting crime and terrorism. It will take time and effort for more permanent cooperation arrangements to be worked out. But the incentives are in place on all sides to make police and intelligence cooperation work post-Brexit,” Benner argues.

Also, when it comes to military security, NATO, not the EU, is the main forum. And NATO will have the same threat perceptions and reasons to provide collective security on 24 June – the day after the 23 referendum — as it had before a possible Brexit. Article 5 will remain article 5. “While the ‘European pillar’ within NATO will get fractured somewhat, this will not undermine the core of the Western military alliance. NATO has been able to live with French exceptionalism for a long time,” Benner notes.

The EU military capabilities will be considerably diminished without the United Kingdom, but EU military missions are flexible in terms of drawing on contributions of willing non-EU members. The EU could benefit with ad-hoc arrangements on U.K. contributions the same way it has included Georgian capabilities in EU missions. At the same time, the rest of the EU may well decide to improve military integration.

Europe today is facing a series of grave security challenges. Britain will have to confront these challenges whether it is inside or outside the EU,” thirteen of Britain’s most senior former military commanders wrote in a letter earlier this year. The same goes for the rest of the EU. It will have to confront these challenges with or without Britain as a member. Of course, says Benner, it would be easier to do so without the political distractions and political weakening of both Britain and the EU that Brexit would cause.

“Without any doubt, in a security environment as volatile as today’s, Brexit carries real risks,” Benner concludes. “But there are few reasons to believe that it will lead to a fundamental weakening of European security. In this regard, European eyes should be set on 8 November not 23 June. The potential election of a President Donald Trump in the United States carries far greater risks for European security than Brexit.”