TSA continues to use unscientific, unreliable program blamed for profiling
2. The TSA broadened the behavior detection program and its surveillance techniques.
In 2009, the TSA expanded the program beyond security checkpoints at airports, enabling “behavior detection officers” — some of them in plain clothes — to “spread throughout the entire airport” and surveil travelers covertly. Officers use “casual conversation” to draw out information from passengers — a technique that appears less like conversation and more like stealth interrogation.
These techniques are troubling because travelers likely will assume that they may not simply ignore officers who converse with them. And various behavioral “indicators” (revealed in documents leaked to The Intercept in 2015) —“gives non-answers,” “lacking details about purpose of trip,” “downplaying of significant facts when answering questions” — show how avoiding contact with behavior detection officers can be construed as an indicator itself.
3. The TSA overstated the scientific validity of behavior detection techniques in communications with Congress.
TSA officials have repeatedly assured members of Congress that the behavior detection program uses “objective criteria” and is “supported by leading experts in the field of behavioral science and law enforcement.” Those statements, however, ignored or misconstrued the body of empirical research in the TSA’s files (or otherwise publicly available) that indicated otherwise.
4. Materials in the TSA’s possession raise questions about possible anti-Muslim bias at the TSA.
Various documents from the TSA’s files reflect a disproportionate focus on or an overt bias against Arabs, Muslims, and people of Middle Eastern or South Asian descent. For instance, until late 2012, training materials for behavior detection officers focused exclusively on examples of Arab or Muslim terrorists, and a TSA-authored presentation titled “Femme Fatale: Female Suicide Bombers” reflects demeaning stereotypes about Muslims and women.
It is unclear whether and how these materials factored into the TSA’s behavior detection program, but they do not provide empirical or scientific support for behavior detection methods, and their existence in the TSA’s records raises concerns about potential bias in TSA programs.
5. The TSA’s documents reveal details of specific instances of racial or religious profiling.
The TSA produced records of investigations into alleged profiling by behavior detection officers in Newark, Chicago, Miami, and Honolulu. Those records highlight the ease with which behavioral indicators can be used as a pretext for harassing minorities and disfavored groups. They also show that some officers refer passengers for additional screening far more often than others—a troubling indication that the TSA’s “indicators” are subjective and arbitrary.
Handeyside concludes:
Based on the documents, our report includes several recommendations: First, the TSA should phase out the behavior detection program. The available information shows that the program lacks scientific support and threatens civil liberties.
The agency should also implement a rigorous anti-discrimination training program for all TSA employees.
Congress should use its oversight role to make sure that these changes happen. Given the anti-Muslim policies coming from the Trump administration, the TSA should not be allowed to retain a program that can be used as a cover for racial and religious profiling.
