Manchester attack: we are in an ‘arms race’ against ever adapting terror networks
Plotters looking at the Manchester Arena would have been aware that access control arrangements going in would risk detection, maybe even prevent detonation, but this did not deter. There would also have been a recognition that the foyer was open and vulnerable and that large crowds still congregated there in that confined space at the night’s end. This is an example of what criminologists call “crime displacement” – if you’re not careful, fortifying one place can result in simply shifting the problem to a neighboring area.
Second, many crowded places are often complex sites. They are multi-functional, encompassing different configurations of businesses and property ownership that affect the coordination and management of security arrangements.
Lastly, terrorist attacks are rare events and so may not be given top priority, notably if a financial cost is involved and the threat is perceived to be low. Commercial priorities will always compete, especially where market conditions are challenging. So there is a fine balance to be sought between the need for security and the normal functioning of a venue.
Can anything more be done?
Security can always be tightened. At Manchester Arena they may wish to consider concourses and foyers with layered access control and perhaps phased passage on exit once a show is over. The site should always aim to make it more difficult, more risky and less rewarding for attackers – measures which are referred to by the generic term “situational crime prevention.” The problem is that attackers can simply direct their focus elsewhere. The recent attacks in Westminster, Paris, Stockholm, Berlin and St. Petersburg demonstrate how versatile target selection can be alongside attack methods (lorries and cars became killing machines and night markets killing fields).
In truth, what can be done is quite limited. It’s impossible to adequately protect a very wide variety of potential targets, at least for the masses (Britain’s rulers fare better). Short of closing them all down, all crowded places suffer essential vulnerabilities when faced with a lone individual with bomb making skills and equipment.
Neither is anyone, at least not yet, calling for what would be to the British a rather extreme scenario as represented by the Israeli model, where all shopping malls, restaurants, hospitals, office buildings or any public facility have licensed private security guards checking bags on entry. For the foreseeable future such risk reduction measures would carry unacceptable costs to finance, civil liberties and convenience. It would also exaggerate the scale of the threat being posed.
Despite all this, the situation is not hopeless. It should be remembered that the attacker did not get inside the arena, which possibly saved lives. Ultimately, the answer to the tactic of terrorism will only lie in a political solution.
Two other lines of approach – which stem from our own research – may also help. My colleagues and I have developed an “indicative tool kit” on how to protect complex sites which are also crowded places, like passenger terminals, from terrorist attack. We concluded that more needs to be done to organize and communicate best practice to site security managers, enabling them to differentiate threats within their sites and develop security plans.
We also need to do more to consider the role of intelligence. Often the first person to know or suspect something about someone moving towards, or involved in, acts of terrorism will be those closest to them: their friends, family and community insiders. Their willingness to come forward and share knowledge, suspicions and concerns with authorities is critical because they offer a first line of defense. We are currently finding out more about the barriers and challenges people face in sharing information or cooperating with authorities, as well as what motivates them to surmount these challenges. This would tell us why those with concerns can fail to engage fully with government reporting campaigns. At the moment this is a critical blind spot in current counter-terrorism thinking and strategy.
Kris Christmann is Researcher, Applied Criminology Center, University of Huddersfield. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation (under Creative Commons-Attribution / No derivative).
