London attackHow can we better protect crowds from terrorism?

By Robert R. Friedmann

Published 6 June 2017

As the recent terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom painfully show, the odds are in favor of terrorists. All they have to do is succeed once, no matter how many times they try. For public safety professionals to be fully successful, they have to prevent 100 percent of the terror attempts. It’s a number to aspire to, but even the most experienced countries fighting terror – such as Israel and the U.K.– can’t measure up to this standard. These days, it’s necessary to consider any place where crowds congregate as vulnerable “soft targets” for the attackers. Community policing, though, could help. Community policing means using the community as a resource to minimize the spread of radical ideologies. By informing and supporting law enforcement through proactive partnerships, citizens can become key players and reliable partners in what some call “co-produced” public safety. These strategies won’t provide absolute security. But they will help minimize attacks and get us closer to that golden 100 percent standard.

GSU president Robert R. Friedmann // Source: gsu.edu

If it seems like every week, there’s another terrorist attack – well, you’re not wrong. According to one crowdsourcing map, there have been over 500 attacks around the world since the start of 2017, with over 3,500 fatalities. For a period in 2016, ISIS-initiated attacks were occurring, on average, every 84 hours.

Many Americans might be wondering, in the wake of so many attacks, how vulnerable they are and what security measures are now in place. There’s also the question of what law enforcement can do better.

In 1992, I founded the Georgia International Law Enforcement Exchange (GILEE), which helped train law enforcement leaders from more than 20 countries and more than 20 states. GILEE would go on to provide significant security assistance to the Olympic Games in Atlanta, Salt Lake City, London and Rio.

Despite improvements in methods and coordination among law enforcement agencies over the past 25 years, they’re still hamstrung in a number of ways. With large public gatherings of people becoming more attractive targets for terrorists, what are the best strategies moving forward?

The limits of physical security
Even though Atlanta had six years to implement a security plan for the 1996 Olympic Games, it didn’t emerge unscathed. On July 27, 1996, Eric Rudolph detonated a homemade pipe bomb shortly after making a warning phone call. Though the bomb left two dead and more than a hundred injured, it could have been far worse (the backpack containing the bomb had been repositioned on the ground, which mitigated the blast). While the IOC decided to continue the Olympic Games, the attack left a black mark on an otherwise successful event.

The bombing in Atlanta happened at the only public venue that remained unsecured because it was free to the wider public. Had security been applied at the Olympic Park, Rudolph wouldn’t have been able to enter with the bomb in his knapsack.

Recognizing the threat posed outside of venues, Olympic security costs have since grown exponentially, and include more personnel and more sophisticated technologies. While Atlanta is estimated to have spent US$200 million, London spent over $1.5 billion. Tokyo in 2020 is projected to spend about $3 billion.