Health sector resilienceMaking U.S. health sector more resilient to major disasters
The health sector in the United States would be far better positioned to manage medical care needs during emergencies of any scale by empowering existing healthcare coalitions to connect community resilience efforts with a network of hospitals equipped to handle disasters, according to a new report. The report’s authors found that while the U.S. health sector is reasonably well prepared for relatively small mass injury/illness events that happen frequently (for example, tornadoes, local disease outbreaks), it is less prepared for large-scale disasters (e.g., hurricanes) and complex mass casualty events (for example, bombings) and poorly prepared for catastrophic health events (for example, severe pandemics, large-scale bioterrorism).
The health sector in the United States would be far better positioned to manage medical care needs during emergencies of any scale by empowering existing healthcare coalitions to connect community resilience efforts with a network of hospitals equipped to handle disasters, according to a new report by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.
The report, A Framework for Healthcare Disaster Resilience: A View to the Future, was released at a 22 February event at the National Press Club.
“We wondered what an optimal system would look like and how we would get there,” said Eric Toner, a senior scholar at the Center and principal investigator on the report. “Change is needed, but the change should be evolutionary, not revolutionary. We need to build on the resources we already have.”
Toner’s coauthors on the report are Center colleagues Monica Schoch-Spana, Richard Waldhorn, Matthew Shearer, and Tom Inglesby. JHCHS says that the team first identified four distinct categories of disasters that could cause significant illness or injury, and for which preparedness gaps likely exist due to differing operational challenges and resource needs. A subsequent gap analysis confirmed their theory: While the U.S. health sector is reasonably well prepared for relatively small mass injury/illness events that happen frequently (for example, tornadoes, local disease outbreaks), it is less prepared for large-scale disasters (e.g., hurricanes) and complex mass casualty events (for example, bombings) and poorly prepared for catastrophic health events (for example, severe pandemics, large-scale bioterrorism).
These gaps, the authors say, exist as a result of the absence of strategies above and beyond the traditional all-hazards approach to improving U.S. health sector preparedness. The authors define the U.S. health sector as all entities and personnel that are involved in people’s health, combined with the community-based organizations that support these entities and represent the patients who receive services from them. This network’s incident-specific response actions and capabilities vary widely across the four categories of disasters.
The authors offer four recommendations for closing preparedness gaps unique to the U.S. health sector:
Build a Culture of Resilience: Launch a new federal program that encourages
