Russia’s corruption, influence “a matter of national security”: U.K. Parliamentary panel

“We can no longer allow ‘business as usual’. The U.K. must be clear that the corruption stemming from the Kremlin is no longer welcome in our markets and we will act. We must be united in our efforts to match rhetoric with action – in the City, through Government policy and among allies in the U.S., G7 and EU. We call on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to set out a coherent strategy on Russia that clearly links together the diplomatic, military and financial tools that the U.K. can use to counter Russian state aggression.”

Conclusions and recommendations
London and the oligarchs
(The paragraph numbers refer to paragraphs in the full report)

1.The use of London as a base for the corrupt assets of Kremlin-connected individuals is now clearly linked to a wider Russian strategy and has implications for our national security. Combating it should be a major U.K. foreign policy priority. The assets stored and laundered in London both directly and indirectly support President Putin’s campaign to subvert the international rules-based system, undermine our allies, and erode the mutually-reinforcing international networks that support U.K. foreign policy. The size of London’s financial markets and their importance to Russian investors gives the U.K. considerable leverage over the Kremlin. But turning a blind eye to London’s role in hiding the proceeds of Kremlin-connected corruption risks signaling that the U.K. is not serious about confronting the full spectrum of President Putin’s offensive measures. (Paragraph 20)

2.We call on the Government to investigate the gaps in the sanctions regime that allowed a company such as En+ to float on the London Stock Exchange, and to work with the G7, whose markets dominate the financial world, and other international partners, to close those gaps as soon as possible. (Paragraph 21)

Making sanctions more effective
3.At the time of publication of this report, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill (2018) is entering the final stages of its passage through Parliament. The passage of the Bill marks an important opportunity for Parliament and the Government to assess the strengths and weaknesses of our existing sanctions regime, and to ensure that sanctions remain an effective part of the U.K.’s foreign policy toolkit. We welcome the Bill’s broad definition of the purpose of sanctions regulations, which will give the Government the power to introduce sanctions for a range of reasons including to further U.K. foreign policy objectives, to promote national and international peace and security, and to promote respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. (Paragraph 29)

4.The significant impact of the newest US sanctions on Russia demonstrates the potential value in targeting Kremlin-linked individuals as a way of putting pressure on the regime to change its aggressive and destabilizing behavior. At the same time, making sanctions relief conditional on specific actions enables the EU to send clearer signals than the US does about how that behavior should change. Since sanctions are most effective when the U.S. and EU act together, the U.K. should make it a priority to identify ways to encourage and adopt best practices from both types of sanctions regime. The Government should also use the G7 format to encourage unity of action among the world’s largest economies, in order to exert maximum financial and economic leverage over the Kremlin. (Paragraph 30)

5.We call on the Government to broaden its approach to sanctions by including individuals closely connected to hostile regimes, where appropriate, while retaining the practice of linking sanctions relief to specific actions. The U.K. should work with EU partners, both before and after leaving the EU, to identify and sanction the individuals and entities on whom the Kremlin relies in carrying out its acts of aggression—including, but not limited to, destabilization of its neighbors, disinformation campaigns, interference in democratic processes and assassination attempts on foreign soil. This should be done in close consultation with the US Treasury and intelligence agencies. Such sanctions should be linked to specific desired changes in the Russian state’s behavior, and should be reviewed annually against progress towards those outcomes. (Paragraph 31)

6.Human rights abusers and their money are not welcome in the U.K. We applaud the inclusion of a Magnitsky clause in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, allowing sanctions regulations to be made for the purpose of preventing, or in response to, a gross human rights abuse or violation. This long-overdue measure sends a powerful signal of support to victims of human rights abuse around the world. (Paragraph 36)

7.We welcome the Government’s promise to publish a list of individuals sanctioned specifically because of gross human rights violations, comparable to the US Magnitsky list. This list should be published and maintained by the FCO and should be distinct from the general list of individuals under financial sanction that is maintained by HM Treasury. (Paragraph 37)

8.In determining whether to sanction specific individuals to provide accountability for or be a deterrent to gross violations of human rights, the Government should co-ordinate as closely as possible with the U.S., EU, G7 and other allies. Individual sanctions are most effective when a united front can be presented. (Paragraph 38)

9.We welcome the Government’s recognition of the need for parliamentary scrutiny of the use of sanctions powers, and to respond to recommendations made by any committee undertaking such scrutiny. Sanctions are primarily an instrument of foreign policy, and only the FCO has the network and intelligence necessary to identify individuals and entities who should be subject to sanctions for the purposes set out in the Bill. The Foreign Affairs Committee is therefore the most appropriate committee to conduct reviews of the Government’s use of sanctions and we stand ready to discuss how such reviews might most effectively be conducted. (Paragraph 39)

10.Russia’s ability to issue new sovereign debt on global markets with the assistance of sanctioned banks undermines the global sanctions regime and supports the aggressive behavior of the Russian state. Any action taken to limit or prohibit the issuance of Russian debt on global markets, however, must be taken jointly by the EU, US and other international partners in order for it to be effective. (Paragraph 43)

11.The Government should work with the EU, and with the US, to prohibit the purchase of bonds in which a sanctioned entity has acted as book runner. It should also seek EU agreement to bar the European clearing houses from making available Russian sovereign debt. (Paragraph 44)

Closing the “laundromat”
12.We welcome the Government’s commitment to establishing a register of ownership for overseas companies that own or wish to own property in the U.K., or are involved in Government contracts. Such a measure will be essential in exposing individuals who purchase U.K. property through offshore shell companies, disguising their identities and the potentially corrupt sources of their funding. (Paragraph 52)

13.The delay in introducing legislation to establish a register of ownership for overseas companies that own property in the U.K. is regrettable. The legislation should be put in place as early as possible, ideally enabling the register to be established before the Government’s target date of 2021. We call on the Government to review this timescale, with a view to expediting it or setting out in more detail why the process needs to take so long. (Paragraph 53)

14.The U.K. is governed by the rule of law, and Ministers are right to assert that they cannot order law enforcement agencies to investigate or prosecute individuals with no basis in evidence. But observing due process cannot be an excuse for inaction or lethargy. There is a clear need for stronger political leadership to show the Government’s commitment to ending the flow of dirty money into the U.K. This must be demonstrated by allocating sufficient resources and capacity to the relevant law enforcement agencies, and by ensuring that those running the agencies are able to draw on information from across Government departments. The Government also needs to consider more effective ways to share intelligence between Departments, including between the FCO and AML supervisors such as the FCA and HMRC, and with the banking sector. (Paragraph 61)

15.While the Government should continue to respect the autonomy and constitutional integrity of the Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies on devolved matters, money laundering is now a matter of national security, and therefore constitutionally under the jurisdiction of the U.K. The Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies are important routes through which dirty money enters the U.K. This cannot continue. While we recognize the important innovations that Overseas Territories such as the British Virgin Islands have made in making registers of beneficial ownership available to U.K. law enforcement, the scale of the problem and the implications for the U.K.’s security now demand a greater response. We welcome the Government’s commitment, now included in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, to assist the Overseas Territories in establishing publicly accessible registers of beneficial ownership. The Government should do everything in its power to enable the Overseas Territories to put these registers in place voluntarily, before the end of 2020. (Paragraph 68)

16.The Government should also recognize the potential impact that the creation of publicly accessible beneficial ownership registers could have on the economies of the Overseas Territories, particularly for those continuing to rebuild after the devastation of Hurricane Irma. The U.K. should share the burden of reconstruction, just as they are sharing the burden of keeping our financial systems clean. We look forward to receiving the Government’s detailed strategy for widening the economic bases of the Overseas Territories, as promised in its response to our March 2018 Report on the U.K.’s response to hurricanes, by 1 September 2018. (Paragraph 69)

17.In its response to this report, the Government should set out its plans for assisting the governments of the Overseas Territories to establish publicly accessible beneficial ownership registers before 31 December 2020. We also call on the Government to provide the same level of assistance to the Crown Dependencies, and to encourage them to take steps to meet the same standard of transparency. (Paragraph 70)

Conclusion: towards a coherent strategy on the Kremlin’s loot
18.The Government is right to respond robustly to the aggressive actions of President Putin’s regime. But reacting in an ad hoc way to the Kremlin’s behavior has led to a disjointed approach. Despite the Government’s strong rhetoric, President Putin’s allies have been able to exploit gaps in the sanctions and anti-money laundering regimes that allow them to hide and launder assets in London. This undermines the strength and unity of the global diplomatic response to Russian state actions, threatens U.K. national security, and helps to enable corrupt kleptocrats to steal from the Russian people. (Paragraph 73)

19.As a nuclear-armed, permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia remains a major player in global affairs with an important voice and a seat at the table. It has the potential to be a force for security and stability. But instead of participating in the international rules-based system, President Putin’s regime uses asymmetric methods to achieve its goals, and others—so-called useful idiots—magnify that effect by supporting its propaganda. Russia’s economy—which, it is worth recalling, is approximately the size of Spain’s—is deeply interconnected to the Western financial system. This gives the U.S., EU and other G7 countries, acting together, significant leverage in seeking to counter the Kremlin’s aggressive behavior. (Paragraph 74)

20.The U.K. must set out a coherent and pro-active strategy on Russia, led by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and co-ordinated across the whole of Government, that clearly links together the diplomatic, military and financial tools that the U.K. can use to counter Russian state aggression. (Paragraph 75)

— Read more in Moscow’s Gold: Russian Corruption in the U.K. (Foreign Affairs Committee, U.K. Parliament, 21 May 2018)