Russian election meddling in the U.S. and beyond

on September 30 in a referendum on the agreement with Greece about the country’s name: voters will be asked: “Are you in favor of European Union and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?” (under which the country’s official name will be Republic of North Macedonia).

Russian media has clearly and deliberately given greater visibility to messaging in support of boycotting the referendum.

Dozens of new websites are popping up each day on Facebook to encourage people to boycott the referendum. These websites, originating outside the country, fit a pattern of Russian interference in other elections, according to the New York Times.

In Germany, the Parliament and other important political institutions have been attacked by hacking operations that have been linked to Russia. In addition, Germany has been a constant target of disinformation in pro-Kremlin media.

In Sweden, a “troll” operated inside the parliament under a number of fake online identities. On top of this exceptional case, Sweden has also over time seen different cases when pro-Kremlin disinformation has targeted the country.

Denmark, Finland, Norway are additional examples of countries that have been targeted by Russian disinformation that could potentially influence opinion forming among voters.

Claims have been made about Russian election interference in Bulgaria; in Scotland’s independence referendum and in the case of a number of other countries; see the list with links to relevant articles on the EUvsDisinfo website.

Trolling and the spread of disinformation are a part of a broader family of information operations, which includes hack-and-leak attacks and other forms of “hybrid” aggression, be it threats and intimidations; covert attacks with chemical and radioactive agents on foreign soil; military operations in Russia’s “near abroad” with the use of alleged proxies or unmarked military personnel; cyber-attacks damaging global infrastructure, espionage and the use of influence agents.

All these measures pursue aims similar to those of disinformation, namely to destabilize societal structures and weaken a counterpart, whereby the perpetrator’s relative position is strengthened.

Many countries have stepped up efforts to counter Russian election meddling for these reasons. Read on the EUvsDisinfo website about the examples of Denmark, France and Sweden.

For a list of relevant publications discussing disinformation attacks on acts of voting in Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, Scotland, Spain, the UK, and the US, see the Elections & Referenda reading list on the EUvsDisinfo website.

For questions of definition and a more thorough discussion of the aims and objectives of disinformation, also beyond elections and political institutions, see our article The Strategy and Tactics of the Pro-Kremlin Disinformation Campaign

This article is published courtesy of EU vs Disinfo