The Russian connectionNo time for complacency: How to combat foreign interference after the midterms
From cabinet officials in the Trump administration to the social media platform companies, there has been widespread acknowledgement in the United States that the Russian government and other authoritarian states targeted the midterm elections and will continue to interfere in U.S. democracy. The administration and Congress have tools at their disposal to raise the costs on those who interfered in the midterms and to deter authoritarian actors from interfering in U.S. democratic institutions and processes in the future. These include punitive measures like sanctions, defensive steps like improving election security and regulating political advertisement online, and congressional oversight functions to hold the administration accountable and keep pressure on tech companies to secure their platforms from manipulation.
From cabinet officials in the Trump administration to the social media platform companies, there has been widespread acknowledgement in the United States that the Russian government and other authoritarian states targeted the midterm elections and will continue to interfere in U.S. democracy. The administration and Congress have tools at their disposal to raise the costs on those who interfered in the midterms and to deter authoritarian actors from interfering in U.S. democratic institutions and processes in the future. These include punitive measures like sanctions, defensive steps like improving election security and regulating political advertisement online, and congressional oversight functions to hold the administration accountable and keep pressure on tech companies to secure their platforms from manipulation.
Full implementation of Executive Order 13848, which President Donald Trump signed on September 12, is a crucial first step to signal to adversaries that interfering in U.S. elections will not be tolerated. The intelligence community is already getting started on implementing the order’s directive for the director of national intelligence (DNI) to deliver a report on foreign interference in a federal election by reporting on the attempt during the midterms. E.O. 13848 defines foreign interference broadly to include:
“Any covert, fraudulent, deceptive, or unlawful actions or attempted actions of a foreign government, or of any person acting as an agent of or on behalf of a foreign government, undertaken with the purpose or effect of influencing, undermining confidence in, or altering the result or reported result of, the election, or undermining public confidence in election processes or institutions.”
This definition covers far more than the hacking of campaign e-mails, alteration of voter registration lists, penetration of voting systems, and manipulation of vote tallies to cover a wide range of disinformation efforts, including content aimed at sowing confusion or undermining faith in the integrity of elections. (E.O. 13848 also calls for the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to issue a report on the narrower question of whether an attempted or actual interference operation affected targeted election or campaign infrastructure). This definition is critical because disinformation seeking to call into question the integrity of the elections, in addition to attempted hacks of politicians and political campaigns’ e-mail accounts, has been part of the Russian government’s tactics to undermine confidence in election results.
