Is There a Role for the Biological Weapons Convention in Oversight of Lab-Created Potential Pandemic Pathogens?

Research by Ron Fouchier in the Netherlands and Yoshihiro Kawaoka in Madison, Wisconsin marked the beginning of a “research enterprise” aimed at creating mammalian-airborne-transmissible, highly-pathogenic, avian-influenza live viruses. Such viruses could be transmitted through the air, similar to seasonal human influenza. Through November 2018, 14 laboratories have been identified in this enterprise.

Lynn C. Klotz writes in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that these viruses are examples of lab-created potentially pandemic pathogens that bring up questions reflecting real concerns: Should details of this dual-use research be published? Could lab-created potentially pandemic pathogens be accidentally released from a laboratory into the community and seed a human pandemic? Could they be employed as biological weapons?

The probability of accidental release into the community from one of the laboratories in this research enterprise is uncomfortably high. For these and other lab-created potentially pandemic pathogens, just one laboratory-infected researcher could seed a pandemic. Concern over a pandemic from a research enterprise laboratory release should rival our grave concern over a natural pandemic; the likelihood of both is similar. Furthermore, a laboratory worker with hostile intent could introduce a potentially pandemic pathogen into the community.

Klotz writes:

Seeding a pandemic is not a problem for future consideration; the possibility is upon us now. There is an urgent need for international oversight and regulation of this research.

The countries that are party to the Biological Weapons Convention  (BWC) may not believe it to be within the BWC mandate to oversee academic research whose goal is public health. But if the parties decide this kind of oversight is within the BWC mandate (under Article XII), guidelines and regulations could be enacted fairly quickly. At the very least, the parties could act as a catalyst, launching discussions toward a new international treaty on oversight and regulation of this dangerous research. In the meantime, since enacting new treaties is an uncertain and long process, the BWC parties should work to pass legislation in their nations.