West Has No Response to Iran’s Increasing Dominance of the Middle East

The capability is rooted in Iranian war-fighting experience and revolutionary ideology. It exploits the Shia community’s affinity with Iran but also enrolls non-Shia communities that share Iran’s objectives. Iran has developed the ability to mobilize recruits and move them across theatres.

Iran has been opportunistic. When involved in conflict,  it calibrates the level and tailors the style of its involvement in such a way as to avoid escalation that could endanger   the regime. It has maintained plausible deniability while providing an enduring platform for influence.

Iran’s third-party capability has enabled it to project its influence deep into other states at relatively low cost, either through the penetration of state institutions in aligned countries (as in Iraq) or through the presence of powerful non- state actors (as with Lebanese Hezbollah). Tehran presides over a regional network of partners capable of projecting force – either under Iran’s direction or, more commonly, independently but in line with shared strategic objectives.

Lebanese Hezbollah has become, through its operations in the Syrian civil war, an independent actor capable of force projection, including in complex military theatres, either as part of a coalition with state actors or alongside local militias. Iran will continue to seize opportunities to expand its third-party capability, but it must manage both the risk of overstretch and of rejection by communities that see it as a foreign, interventionist state. Tehran is aware of these risks, which it manages in accordance with its own tolerance levels. So far, it has not been constrained by conventional actors and strategies, including sanctions, in pursuing this approach to conflict. Iran is likely to rely on the use of third parties in both conflict and post-conflict settlements to consolidate its sphere of influence in the Arab world.

John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive, writes in The Telegraph:

Iran has tipped the balance of effective force in the Middle East to its advantage by developing a sovereign capability to conduct warfare through third parties. An international debate on how to cope with Iran’s way of warfare, needs to be based on the facts of this uniquely generated strategic capability.

In July 2019 President Donald Trump tweeted that “Iran has never won a war but never lost a negotiation”. The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) analysis of Iran’s networks in the Middle East published today suggests a reversal: Tehran has lost faith in negotiations following the collapse of the Iran nuclear deal but has found a way to win in war.

While the conventional military balance remains heavily in favor of the US and its allies, Iran has tipped the balance of effective force in the Middle East to its advantage by developing a sovereign capability to conduct warfare through third parties. Iran contests and wins wars “fought among the people”, not wars between states. It avoids symmetrical state-on-state conflict, knowing that it will be outgunned. Instead, it pursues asymmetrical warfare through non-state partners.

This sovereign capability is of greater strategic value to Tehran than its conventional forces, its ballistic missiles or even its rejuvenating nuclear program. It is a weapon of choice that is peculiarly suited to today’s regional conflicts. These contests are not defined by state-on-state warfare, involving parity of forces subject to international law, but are complex and congested battlespaces involving no rule of law or accountability, low visibility, and multiple players who represent a mosaic of local and regional interests. 

Iran has developed this capability to fight and win while maintaining hostilities at a level that minimizes the likelihood of retaliation against Iran itself. In Syria, for example, Iran’s Quds Force directed both foreign and domestic militias to save Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Iran is now embedding itself in Syria’s evolving government and informal security structures. While this is affordable, flexible, and deniable for Tehran, it also works to counter any US. .presence in the country, enhance Iran’s threat to Israel, hedge against Russian policy and ensure a lasting role regardless of the Assad regime’s fate.

Iran’s asymmetric warfare has encountered no effective international response and poses a considerable challenge, as Iran’s adversaries cannot simply rebalance its influence in the region through the application of conventional power. Conventional force has neither deterred, nor limited, the steady development, over 40 years, of Iran’s sovereign capability to conduct this specialized type of warfare. Its “persistent engagement” in neighboring jurisdictions is hard for others to match because the country has honed a specialist strategy for building its own support system within fragile states. Its doctrine is rooted in Iranian war-fighting experience and revolutionary ideology. It often exploits the Shia community’s affinity with Iran but also sometimes enrolls non-Shia communities that share Iran’s objectives. 

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Iran may eventually enter into negotiations over the extent of its influence networks but, so far, its reaction to mounting pressure has been to defend its allies, hold fast to its partnerships, and repeat the narrative of resistance. The Supreme Leader could reverse this strategic choice. However, Iran’s influence networks comprise a sovereign capability that is now part of its strategic personality. Renouncing them would entail not only a loss of influence but of identity. They have become a core strategic asset to the regime. Sanctions alone are unlikely to force the regime to give up a capability that has given it such a vital outer cordon of protection.

Weak states and divided societies are easy prey for Iranian influence. In Iraq, Syria and Yemen, Iran has pursued non-state partnerships opportunistically. In countries that have been able to develop a measure of good governance, Iran’s influence has been blunted, limiting its ability to create the next Hezbollah. Neighborhood fragility is good for Iran’s way of warfare; strong institutions that serve a healthy national purpose are a necessary, if not always sufficient, first line of defense against it. An international debate on how to cope with Iran’s way of warfare, needs to be based on the facts of this uniquely generated strategic capability.