PERSPECTIVE: Election Night Reporting (ENR)Preparing for Election Night: Counting and Reporting the Vote in Battleground States

Published 2 November 2020

Disinformation surrounding election night reporting of vote counts poses a unique threat to public confidence in U.S. election results. Jack Caleb and colleagues note that election night reporting (ENR) refers to the real-time report of unofficial results that election officials share with the public after polls close. “This year, ENR may continue several days past Election Day due to the increased use of vote-by-mail and differing timelines among states for when mail-in ballots can be counted,” they write.

Disinformation surrounding election night reporting of vote counts poses a unique threat to public confidence in U.S. election results. Jack Caleb and colleagues write in Lawfare that election night reporting (ENR) refers to the real-time report of unofficial results that election officials share with the public after polls close. “This year, ENR may continue several days past Election Day due to the increased use of vote-by-mail and differing timelines among states for when mail-in ballots can be counted,” they write.

The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have recently sounded multiple alarms about disinformation and interference in the 2020 U.S. election. In a Sept. 22 public service announcement, the FBI and CISA specifically flagged incomplete election results as a potential target for foreign actors seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the American democratic process. The statement urged the American public to remain aware of, and vigilant for, foreign disinformation around unofficial election results.

Experts agree that for voters to protect themselves against disinformation on election night, it is crucial to understand how ENR works. News sources like the Associated Press draw from a wide range of tools to “call” an election, and even if the vote count is not completely finished, it may be possible to call a state. However, we have seen in elections past and present that disinformation and misinformation functioning to undermine the legitimacy of the election can spread, regardless of the integrity of the election process itself. Moreover, the confusion and ambiguity around ENR and the technicalities of counting can leave voters vulnerable to false narratives that point to apparent incongruencies in the electoral process.

This happened in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, in 2004, when a conspiracy theory of voter fraud gained traction due to a discrepancy in the reported estimated voter turnout and the reported vote count. This inconsistency led some residents to conclude that fraudulent ballots were cast. In reality, the discrepancy was explained by a timing issue that came down to exactly when each figure was collected and reported. Knowing that these two figures were reported at different times could have stymied the spread of such a conspiracy.

Caleb et al. have broken down election night procedures in each of the battleground states to present measures that Americans can take to better prepare for the information storm to come that night. They urge readers to see the Healthy Election Project’s recent “Counting the Vote” memo for a more in-depth analysis of vote tabulation and certification processes.