Nuclear mattersFukushima lessons for U.K.'s nuclear industry

Published 19 May 2011

An interim assessment of the implications of the nuclear crisis in Japan concludes there is no need to curtail the operations of nuclear plants in the United Kingdom but lessons should be learnt; the report identifies twenty-five recommended areas for review — by either industry, the government, or regulators — to determine whether sensible and appropriate measures can further improve safety in the U.K. nuclear industry; these include reviews of the layout of U.K. power plants, emergency response arrangements, dealing with prolonged loss of power supplies, and the risks associated with flooding

An interim assessment of the implications of the nuclear crisis in Japan concludes there is no need to curtail the operations of nuclear plants in the United Kingdom but lessons should be learnt.

The U.K.’s Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations, Mike Weightman, yesterday publishes a report, requested by the U.K. government, in which he calls for action to be taken to learn from events at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station.

An Office of Nuclear Regulations release notes that his report identifies twenty-five recommended areas for review — by either industry, the government, or regulators — to determine whether sensible and appropriate measures can further improve safety in the U.K. nuclear industry. These include reviews of the layout of U.K. power plants, emergency response arrangements, dealing with prolonged loss of power supplies, and the risks associated with flooding.

The twenty-sixth recommendation calls for plans to be published by the middle of June detailing how each of these twenty-five matters will be addressed.

Weightman said:

The extreme natural events that preceded the accident at Fukushima — the magnitude 9 earthquake and subsequent huge tsunami — are not credible in the U.K. We are 1,000 miles from the nearest fault line and we have safeguards in place that protect against even very remote hazards. Our operating and proposed future reactor designs and technology are different to the type at the Fukushima plant.

But we are not complacent. No matter what the differences are, and how high the standard of design and subsequent operation of the nuclear facilities here in the U.K., the quest for improvement must never stop. Seeking to learn from events, and from new knowledge, both nationally and internationally, must continue to be a fundamental feature of the safety culture of the U.K. nuclear industry.

The Japanese people are still dealing with the aftermath of this terrible event. The full facts are not clear. I depart for Japan next week to lead a fact-finding mission on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with support from nuclear experts from across the world. This will help inform my final and more comprehensive ‘lessons learned’ report which I will publish in September.”

The report was requested by the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change within days of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami of 11 March that led to the crisis at Fukushima Dai-ichi. This is the interim report requested by Chris Huhne. The full, more comprehensive report will be published in September.

 

The report’s recommendations include:

  • The U.K. nuclear industry should initiate a review of flooding studies, including from tsunamis, in light of the Japanese experience, to confirm the design basis and margins for flooding at U.K. nuclear sites, and whether there is a need to improve further site-specific flood risk assessments as part of the periodic safety review program, and for any new reactors. This should include sea-level protection.
  • The U.K. nuclear industry should ensure that the design of new spent fuel ponds close to reactors minimizes the need for bottom penetrations and lines that are prone to siphoning faults. Any that are necessary should be as robust to faults as are the ponds themselves.
  • The U.K. nuclear industry should review the need for, and if required, the ability to provide longer-term coolant supplies to nuclear sites in the United Kingdom in the event of a severe off-site disruption, considering whether further on-site supplies or greater off-site capability is needed. This relates to both carbon dioxide and fresh water supplies, and for existing and proposed new plants.
  • The U.K. nuclear industry should review, and if necessary extend, analysis of accident sequences for long-term severe accidents. This should identify appropriate repair and recovery strategies to the point at which a stable state is achieved, identifying any enhanced requirements for central stocks of equipment and logistical support.

“Learning from Fukushima, this report makes clear the need to minimize the quantity of spent fuel stored on U.K. reactor sites, which is to be welcomed,” Professor Neil Hyatt, RAEng/NDA Chair in Radioactive Waste Management at Sheffield University, told the Engineer.

 

“More broadly, the indefinite storage of substantial quantities of radioactive wastes in aged facilities on multiple U.K. nuclear sites must be subject to similar challenge. There is a clear need to process such wastes into passive safe materials to reduce on-site hazards, particularly in relation to an unforeseen and severe accident.”

—Read more in Office for Nuclear Regulation, Japanese earthquake and tsunami: Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry, Interim Report (18 May 2011)