Public healthIncreasing cooperation between security, health officials

Published 2 December 2010

Those in charge of preventing and treating man-made diseases (bioterrorism) and those in charge of preventing and treating naturally occurring epidemics have increased cooperation because of a growing recognition by both sides that only way to monitor the rapidly increasing globalization of “dual-use” biological technology — which can be used in regular research efforts or clandestinely put toward a weapons program — is to pool their resources

Two international measures designed to boost each country’s preparedness against manmade or natural disease outbreaks have also succeeded in bringing law enforcement and public health officials closer together to combat such threats, a panel of experts said last week.

Yet while the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations have increased cooperation, officials from the security and health communities also must be careful not to encroach on each other’s domain or become bogged down in semantics, they warned.

Global Security Newswire quotes Keiji Fukuda, the WHO assistant director-general for health security and environment, to say that there are more opportunities for the two communities to interact today because of a growing recognition by both sides that only way to monitor the rapidly increasing globalization of “dual-use” biological technology — which can be used in regular research efforts or clandestinely put toward a weapons program — is to pool their resources.

When we look at the two [measures], you can see there is a large potential area of overlap,” he said during a speaker event on global health and security organized by the University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Biosecurity. “In fact they are very similar in certain respects and they highlight the need for certain things like surveillance and capacity building. These are very prominent in the thinking behind both of the treaties.”

The BWC and the regulations are “complementary” because they contain obligations for member states to assist each other during a biological event, as well as provisions on cooperation for capacity building and information exchange, said Christopher Park, director of the biological policy staff in the U.S. State Department’s International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau.

In response to a biological attack, you do things other than what you need for a basic health response,” said Park, whose bureau oversees U.S. efforts under the Biological Weapons Convention. “But if you don’t have public health response in place, [and] you don’t have disease surveillance and other measures, you have a problem. You haven’t taken the first step.”

The International Health Regulations, which were revised in 2005 and entered into force in 2007, require member nations to report any “public health emergency of international concern,” such as an infectious disease outbreak with the potential to cross national borders.

The regulations also require countries to strengthen their existing capacities for public health surveillance and response.

The Biological Weapons Convention, which entered into force