Analysis // Ben FrankelNation states, not only terrorist organizations, consider dirty bombs

Published 11 October 2007

Six decades ago the U.S. seriously considered including radiological weapons (“dirty bombs”) in its arsenal; Syria and Iran are doing so today; U.S. should have a dirty-bomb nonproliferation policy

The 6 September Israeli air strike in north-east Syria is shrouded in mystery, with Israel, Syria, and United States saying very little except to admit that such a strike took place. We should be careful that the very language we use to understand what is afoot does not confuse us further. Here is an example: In a front-page article in Wednesday’s New York Times, Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper write that “At issue is whether intelligence that Israel presented months ago to the White House — to support claims that Syria had begun early work on what could become a nuclear weapons program with help from North Korea — was conclusive enough to justify military action by Israel and a possible rethinking of American policy toward the two nations.” The issue, though, is not whether or not Syria “had begun early work on what could become a nuclear weapons program.” Syria does not have the wherewithal, scientific and engineering base, and infrastructure to begin a nuclear weapons program. What Syria is interested in is in equipping some of its missiles with radioactive material in order to be able to threaten Israel with dirty bombs. We know that Syria is working hard on developing airburst capability for its ballistic missiles. Such technology would allow it to detonate warheads in the air in order better to disperse the warhead’s material more widely. There are two types of materials which would be more effectively dispersed — and, hence, would inflict more damage — by air bursts: Chemical materials and radioactive materials.

Syria is not hiding the fact that, with the help of Iranian and North Korean engineers, it is trying to perfect its airburst capabilities. These efforts are risky. Syria admitted that on 23 July, fifteen of its officers were killed (or “martyred,” as the official Syrian news agency described it) as a joint Syrian-Iranian team was attempting to mount a chemical warhead on a Scud missile; an explosion occurred, spreading lethal chemical agents, including sarin nerve gas. Western intelligence source learned that a few Iranian officers were killed as well. Now, whether or not the Israeli air strike against the Syrian facility was justified is a different question, and whether or not Israeli military proficiency is going to be effective in the long run if it is not accompanied by more flexible and creative approach to the Israeli-Palestinian question, and