Quo Vadis Turkey?

served Erdogan as a stage on which to demonstrate his Muslim and Middle Eastern orientations.

The AKP government’s Islamic ideological and political orientation has turned Turkey into a friendly competitor with Iran over the leadership role of the Islamist, pro-Palestinian, and anti-Israeli camp in the Muslim world. What is helping Turkey is the fact the more typical anti-Israel leaders such as Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi are in decline, while avowedly anti-Israel Yemen has become preoccupied with internal, al Qaeda-related problems. Iran, a Shi’a nation, may have a marriage of convenience with Sunni Hamas, but it is awkward for Sunnis to accept Shi’as as the defenders of a Sunni rights. Turkey is thus a more natural fit.

Indeed, Erdogan’s actions mark the first time that a Turkish prime minister has taken the lead in posing as the savior of Palestinians facing Israeli oppression. Similarly, while in the past Turkey’s moves toward Israel were motivated by considerations of realpolitik, Erdogan appears to be guided by a quasi-messianic approach that resembles the actions of Egypt’s Gamal Abd al Nasser during the 1950s and 1960s.

Since Erdogan’s party came to power some eight years ago, the Islamist approach has been on the ascendancy in Turkey. The EU’s reluctance to offer Turkey membership only strengthened the hand of those who questioned the Kemalite approach to begin with.

The Turkic approach. The third approach is the Turkic one. The ultra-nationalist supporters of this approach see Turkey’s role not with the West and not with the Muslim-Arab world, but rather as the unifying leader of the Turkic people. The Turkics are peoples residing in northern, central, and western Asia, Mongolia, southern Siberia, northwestern China, and parts of eastern Europe. They speak languages belonging to the Turkic language family. They share, to varying degrees, certain cultural traits and historical backgrounds.

Note that there are several international organizations created with the purpose of furthering cooperation among countries with Turkic-speaking populations, such as the Joint Administration of Turkic Arts and Culture (TÜRKSOY) and the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking Countries (TÜRKPA). The newly established Turkic Council, founded on 3 November 2009 by the Nakhchivan Agreement, has its headquarters in Istanbul and includes Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey. The remaining two Turkic states, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, are not yet official members of the council, but both are expected to join soon. The council aims to integrate these countries, and Turkic ethnic minorities and diaspora groups in other countries, into a tighter geopolitical framework.

Whether or not Turkey finally succeeds in being accepted to membership in the EU depends, among other things, on which approach to Turkey’s nationalism gains the upper hand in Turkey.

4. Timing was not good for those in Turkey who want to see their country join the EU. The serious consideration of Turkey’s application for membership has coincided with growing unease about the presence of Muslims in western European societies — and debates on how best to address the issue. It is not very likely that a decision on Turkey’s EU membership — which would mean allowing millions of Turks to settle anywhere in Europe — will be made before a consensus emerges on how best to address the more general Muslim issue in Europe.

Which brings us to the question we asked at the beginning: which way will Turkey go now, domestically and internationally? Erdogan and the AKP may have their preferences, but they will soon find out how right the late Robert W. Tucker was when he said: “What inclinations may compel, circumstances nearly always qualify.”

Ben Frankel is editor of the Homeland Security NewsWire