Sorting the bad guys from the good

Published 4 February 2010

Israel’s WeCu claims a 95 percent success rate for its new terrorist detection system that monitors reactions to visual stimuli at airports and checkpoints; the company’s device flashes stimuli, such as photos, a symbol, or a code word, relating to the information authorities are most interested in (whether it is terrorism, drug smuggling, or other crimes), to passengers as they pass through terminal checkpoints; hidden biometric sensors then detect the subjects’ physical reactions and subtle behavioral changes remotely or during random contact

At the airport, how can you tell the good guys from the bad guys? The sad truth, as recent terror incidents have shown, is that there seems to be no foolproof way. Now a new detection system designed by an Israeli start up could improve the chances — eliminating some of the problems inherent in the most popular detection systems, and increasing the odds of nabbing a potential terrorist.

WeCu raises detection to a whole new level. The company’s device — which was six years in the making — flashes stimuli, such as photos, a symbol, or a code word, relating to the information authorities are most interested in (whether it is terrorism, drug smuggling, or other crimes), to passengers as they pass through terminal checkpoints.

 

Hidden biometric sensors then detect the subjects’ physical reactions and subtle behavioral changes remotely or during random contact. Based on their reactions, the authorities determine whether further investigation or questioning is warranted. The rationale is that when a person is exposed to stimuli relating to behaviors that he or she is engaged in or familiar with, the reactions to the images will be heightened.

For example, a subject could be sitting in a room with other people, when a photo of one of his relatives flashes on the screen. We would expect the subject to react differently to that image than the others do. The reaction could include a more rapid heartbeat, eye fluctuation, increased blood pressure, etc.” Givon explains.

David Shamah writes that it is a very different approach to current security methods, which include intelligence, advance knowledge, criminal and psychological profiling, and of course baggage checks, body searches, and shoe removal.

As the failed Christmas attack demonstrated, intelligence is not foolproof. A warning by the father of the Nigerian terrorist who planned to blow up a plane over Detroit in December that authorities should “watch out” for his son apparently went unheeded. U.S. officials say that such warnings are not unusual, and there was nothing in Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab’s background or application that indicated that he was too dangerous to be allowed into the United States.

As for profiling — pulling people out of line for carrying extra large bags, wearing raincoats on a hot day, or just looking suspicious — critics claim that it produces numerous false positives, while wasting time and resources. Also, once terrorists learn what profilers are looking for,