9/11: nine years onU.S. much safer today than it was in 2001

Published 14 September 2010

Leading analyst says the United States is much safer today than it was in 2001; the successful policies of the Bush and Obama administrations have whittled al Qaeda “central” down to about 400 fighters; the real threat of al Qaeda was that it would inspire some percentage of the world’s 1.57 billion Muslims, sending out unstoppable waves of jihadis; in fact, across the Muslim world, militant Islam’s appeal has plunged; the real danger is America’s overreaction, both abroad and domestically

Is the United States safer today than it was o, 9/11? Fareed Zakaria’s answer is a resounding Yes. In a Washington Post article he makes a compelling case for his conclusion, and here are the highlights.

  • During the 1990s, al Qaeda ran training camps through which as many as 20,000 fighters may have passed. It was able to operate successfully during that decade and into the next because most governments treated the group as an annoyance rather than a major national-security challenge. After the 9/11attacks, the world’s attitude changed dramatically, and the series of security measures instituted since then have proved effective.
  • One example: sealing cockpit doors has made it highly unlikely that an airplane could ever again be used as a missile.
  • In addition, U.S. forces went on the offensive in Afghanistan, toppling the regime that supported al Qaeda, destroying its camps, and chasing its recruits around the mountains of the region. Washington, in partnership with other governments, has tracked the communications, travel and — most important — money that fuels terrorism operations, blocking these at every turn.

Zakaria writes that the Bush administration deserves credit for these measures. “Whatever one may think of its subsequent decisions, its policies to secure the homeland and go after al Qaeda in 2001 and 2002 were mostly smart and successful.”

  • President Obama’s decision to amp up the campaign against al Qaeda in Pakistan has further fractured the group.
  • Al Qaeda “central” — Osama bin Laden and his gang — has been whittled down to about 400 fighters. It has been unable to execute large-scale attacks of the kind that were at the core of its strategy — to hit high-value American targets that held military or political symbolism.
  • Instead, the terrorist attacks after 9/11 have been launched by smaller local groups, self-identified as affiliates of al Qaeda, against much easier sites — the nightclub in Bali; cafes in Casablanca and Istanbul; hotels in Amman, Jordan; train stations in Madrid and London.

The fatal problem with these kinds of attacks,” Zakaria notes, “is that they kill ordinary civilians — not U.S. soldiers or diplomats — and turn the local population against Islamic radicals.”

  • The real threat of al Qaeda was that it would inspire some percentage of the world’s 1.57 billion Muslims, sending out unstoppable waves of jihadis.
  • In fact, across the Muslim world, militant Islam’s appeal has plunged. In the half of the Muslim world that holds elections, parties that are in any way associated with Islamic jihad tend to fare miserably, even in Pakistan, which has the most serious terrorism problem of any country today.
  • Over the past few years, imams and Muslim leaders across the world have been denouncing suicide bombings, terrorism, and al Qaeda with regularity.

Of course, we are not 100 percent safe, nor will we ever be. Open societies and modern technology combine to create a permanent danger. Small groups of people can do terrible things. “We could make ourselves much safer still, but that would mean many, many more restrictions on our freedoms to move, congregate, associate and communicate,” Zakaria notes.

 

The question, Zakaria asks, is whether or not we have gone too far: “Is the vast expansion in governmental powers and bureaucracies — layered on top of the already enormous military-industrial complex of the Cold War — warranted? Does an organization that has as few as 400 members and waning global appeal require the permanent institutional response we have created?”

Zakaria is on record — see his 2008 Newsweek essay — as saying that the United States has engaged in a “massive overreaction” to al Qaeda. He concludes:

During the Bush years, there was a reluctance on the left to acknowledge that the administration could have done anything worthwhile to counter terrorism. The far greater problem is on the right, where it has become an article of faith that we are gravely threatened by vast swarms of Islamic terrorists, many within the country.

This campaign to spread a sense of imminent danger has fueled a climate of fear and anger. It has created suspicions about U.S. Muslims — who are more assimilated than in any other country in the world. Ironically, this is precisely the intent of terrorism. Bin Laden knew he could never weaken America directly, even if he blew up a dozen buildings or ships. But he could provoke an overreaction by which America weakened itself.