Tuaregs set Sahara aflame, proclaim new country
independence from the southern-based regimes in both those nations. Mali has seen four major Tuareg secessionist rebellions since 1960. Niger has seen three major Tuareg secessionist wars, most recently in 2009.
The Tuareg also dominate southwest Libya, and had became an important part of the armed forces of Libya. During the 2011 NATO-supported anti-regime uprising in Libya, Col. Muammar Gaddafi relied heavily upon African troops, from the Fezzan region of Libya, as well as mercenary troops from elsewhere in Africa, to support his regime. Tuareg troops fought on both sides of the rebellion, receiving heavy weapons from Gaddafi and seizing arms from abandoned Libyan military bases. After the killing of Gaddafi in April, 2011, thousands of heavily armed Tuareg returned to Mali.
The 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali succeeded beyond all expectations. The northern oasis towns of Mali fell in rapid succession: Menaka was attacked on 16 January 2012; Anderamboukane and Lere fell on 26 January 2012; and the Tuareg finally captured Menaka on 1 February 2012. During February 2012, the Tuareg captured the border town of Tinzaouatin, with the Mali military garrison fleeing for their lives across the border into Algeria, abandoning their weapons to the rebels.
During March, 2012, the Tuareg rebellion captured half of Mali. On 11 March, more than 600 Tuareg troops took the major town of Tessalit and its airport after the Mali government efforts to resupply the town had failed. Malian military forces fled toward the border with Algeria, again abandoning their heavy weapons and armored vehicles. The sweeping success of the rebellion, and mounting protests and riots in Mali’s southern capital of Bamako, prompted the 22 March military coup, toppling the elected government of President Toure.
The oup was promptly condemned by the UN Security Council and the African Union, but only caused further disarray in the crumbling Mali military resistance to the Tuareg rebellion. The historic cities of Timbuktu and Gao on the Niger River bend quickly fell to the Tuareg in early April. In addition, the Mali government discredited itself by employing foreign mercenaries, including attack helicopter pilots from Ukraine, who were cited for the indiscriminate massacre of civilians.
On 6 April, after capturing Timbuktu, the Tuareg rebel leadership, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) proclaimed their new country, the Independent State of Azawad (see New York Times’s report).
The new state of Azawad is not yet recognized by any other state. The U.S. State Department issued a statement saying, “We reject the MNLA’s statement of independence and reiterate our call for the territorial integrity of Mali.” The French Foreign Ministry spokesman declared the Declaration of Independence to be “null and void” and affirmed France’s commitment to the “territorial integrity of Mali, ” acknowledging, however, that “the demands of the northern Tuareg population are old and for too long had not received adequate and necessary responses” (see report in VOA Breaking News).
The rump Mali government has denounced the new State of Azawad, claiming that it is heavily infiltrated by al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This has been vigorously denied by the Azawad leadership, which noted that no al Qaeda member holds any position with the government of Azawad, and that the ideological bases for Azawad independence are ethnic and regional, not Islamic. The divisions between the new Azawad State and AQIM have been widely noted.
The Azawad leadership has renounced any territorial claim to the Tuareg regions of neighboring Niger and Algeria, pledging to respect the territorial integrity of the neighboring states. On 23 April the Azawad government declared an end to military actions.
The 2009 Tuareg rebellion in neighboring Niger raised concerns because of the extensive open-pit uranium mines in Arlit in the northern, Tuareg-inhabited Niger region of Agadez. The 2009 rebellions threatened Arlit and raised alarms that al Queda affiliates could seize quantities of bulk uranium ore for export to Iran or North Korea, or for terrorist use. The improbable logistics of such an ore-shipping operation and the collapse of the Niger rebellion ultimately allayed those concerns (Niger’s uranium played a role in recent history: in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States argued that Iraq had tried to obtain “yellow cake,” or uranium concentrate powder, from Niger in order to relaunch Iraq’s nuclear weapons program).
With continuing disarray in the government of Mali — the initial coup leader, Captain Senogo, has already resigned and been replaced by an interim president, Dioncounda Traoré — the prospects of a competent Mali military counterattack against Azawad look slight. The diplomatic challenge for Azawad will be to secure recognition, either directly or, as was done by newly-independent South Sudan, through peace agreements with the rump Mali state whicht will ultimately lead to their international recognition (see this Maghaebia’s report).
