WAR IN UKRAINEWhat Went Wrong with Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – and Why?
Why has the Russian campaign in Ukraine, at least so far, not gone Putin’s way? Experts who have examined Russia’s failures in Ukraine found that of the flaws in planning and execution identified by experts, several categories of failure stand out: a) Underestimating the Ukrainian leaders’, military’s and public’s will and ability to resist; b) underestimating the collective West’s will and capability to aid Ukraine; c) poor planning of the military campaign, calling for simultaneous achievement of multiple objectives along several axes, unachievable with resources committed to attaining these objectives; and d) failure to establish a single chain of command for the operation, to ensure that advancing units have adequate and timely protection and supplies and to achieve air superiority.
When the Washington Post’s editorial board declared that “the war is not going Putin’s way” only three days after the Russian president ordered an invasion of Ukraine, it seemed the esteemed publication’s writers had jumped the gun. However, subsequent weeks suggested they were onto something, as Russian offensives stalled and reports emerged of Russian soldiers having to forage for food and fuel.
Eleven weeks after the Feb. 24 invasion it is clear that Vladimir Putin’s initial plan has failed. What is less clear is what exactly went wrong and why. We have scoured dozens of commentaries and interviews by experts—mostly military and mostly Western, but also Russian, Ukrainian and Asian—in search of answers.
The staff of Russia Matters, published by Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, examined Russia’s failures in Ukraine, and found that of the flaws in planning and execution identified by experts, several categories of failure stand out:
· Underestimating the Ukrainian leaders’, military’s and public’s will and ability to resist;
· Underestimating the collective West’s will and capability to aid Ukraine;
· Poor planning of the military campaign, calling for simultaneous achievement of multiple objectives along several axes, unachievable with resources committed to attaining these objectives;
· Failure to establish a single chain of command for the operation, to ensure that advancing units have adequate and timely protection and supplies and to achieve air superiority.
More detailed descriptions of these and other miscalculations in Russia’s campaign are offered below, from both experts and journalists. But the longish list does not mean that either Russian defeat or continued Western unity in support of Ukraine is a done deal.
Poor Military Planning / Overestimating Russian Forces
Poor planning of the military campaign, calling for simultaneous achievement of multiple objectives along several axes with a quantitatively and qualitatively insufficient invading force/overestimating the capabilities of the Russian armed forces:
· Carnegie Endowment’s Alexander Gabuev, 03.14.22: “As the [Russian] leadership saw things, the fewer people who knew what the mission was, the better. And we have evidence that when, one day in advance, they finally did tell senior commanders what the ultimate mission was, many of them were visibly shaken and there was a lot of pushback.” (Octavian Report)
