CHINA WATCHReaction Isn’t Enough. Nexperia Case Shows We Must Pre-empt China’s Tech Grabs
The Dutch government’s decision on 30 September to impose a last-resort restraint order on China-owned Netherlands-based chipmaker Nexperia is more than a trade dispute. It’s the consequence of a belated realization that technology competition with China is real. Economic security in open and liberal democracies demands foresight, not last-minute intervention.
The Dutch government’s decision on 30 September to impose a last-resort restraint order on China-owned Netherlands-based chipmaker Nexperia is more than a trade dispute. It’s the consequence of a belated realization that technology competition with China is real. Economic security in open and liberal democracies, including Australia, demands foresight, not last-minute intervention.
The Dutch order, which prohibits Nexperia moving assets without government consent, was both necessary and overdue. Nexperia is one of the world’s largest producers of semiconductor components for automotive and consumer electronics.
In 2017, it was acquired by Chinese investors who sold it to Shanghai Wingtech in 2018. Now, court documents and media reporting have revealed that Nexperia’s chief executive, Zhang Xuezheng, had been preparing to transfer Europe-based intellectual property, production lines and know-how to China.
Three developments converged to create the crisis.
The first was China’s tech-industrial strategy. Wingtech, Nexperia’s parent company, was incubated as part of Beijing’s Little Giants program in 2021. This initiative supports thousands of companies contributing to China’s drive for high-tech self-reliance. Through this affiliation, Nexperia became part of President Xi Jinping’s ambition to make China the world’s dominant technology power.
The second was The Hague’s own complacency. The 2018 acquisition of Nexperia should have raised a red flag. That same year, global attitudes towards China began to harden. The Dutch intelligence service warned in that year that China posed ‘the greatest threat to the Netherlands’ economic security.’ It has repeated the warning annually since then.
The third was US policy to restrain Chinese access to advanced technologies. In 2024, US export control authorities placed Wingtech on a sanctions list. In September 2025, they designated Nexperia as an affiliated entity ‘aiding China’s efforts to acquire sensitive semiconductor manufacturing capabilities’.
After seven years of inaction, the Dutch government had to invoke a 1957 emergency law, never used before, as a last-ditch attempt to prevent the outflow of critical technology. There’s no guarantee of success. Beijing’s response was swift: its Ministry of Commerce imposed export bans on Nexperia’s Chinese fabrication plants, halting the shipment of essential components to Europe. It also placed the onus squarely on The Hague to ‘resolve the issue’. That triggered discord among European governments as Germany’s Volkswagen and BMW warned of a risk they’d need to halt production.
The Nexperia case underscores a hard truth: countries that welcomed Chinese investment into sectors now deemed critical to national security need to rethink their safeguards. Australia has identified 64 such technologies.
