OUR PICKSTracking Domestic Deployments, One Missing Report at a Time | Mum’s the Word on FISA Section 702 Reauthorization | Don't Call It Cyber Command 2.0, and more
· Counting the Boots: Tracking Domestic Deployments, One Missing Report at a Time
· The Feedback Loop Between Online Extremism and Acts of Violence
· What’s Up with the Terror Indictment Against Alleged Antifa Members?
· Mum’s the Word on FISA Section 702 Reauthorization
· Without a Standard for Autonomy, the U.S. Military Will Get Lost in the Fog of War
· What Climate Change Will Do to America by Mid-Century
· Kathryn Bigelow on “A House of Dynamite” and the Nuclear “Elephant in the Room”
· Don’t Call It Cyber Command 2.0: Master Plan for Digital Forces Will Take Years to Implement
Counting the Boots: Tracking Domestic Deployments, One Missing Report at a Time (Loren Voss, Lawfare)
A monthlong effort to track domestic deployments revealed a troubling lack of transparency on why and how military forces are used on U.S. soil.
The Feedback Loop Between Online Extremism and Acts of Violence (Mariana Olaizola Rosenblat, Just Security)
In the wake of the Charlie Kirk assassination and other recent attacks, the United States faces a resurgence of politically motivated violence that is deeply intertwined with the digital sphere. Digital Aftershocks, our new report at the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, examines how extremists across the ideological spectrum — far-right, far-left, violent Islamist, and nihilistic violent extremists (NVEs) — exploit acts of violence to recruit followers, justify their ideologies, and sustain propaganda networks.
Our findings are grounded in open-source intelligence collected from March to September 2025, a period marked by deadly attacks in Utah, Minneapolis, and Washington, D.C. While scholars and policymakers have long debated whether online rhetoric “causes” real-world violence, this report looks primarily at the middle of that cycle: how violent incidents are transformed into digital fuel that normalizes aggression and prepares the ground for future attacks.
What’s Up with the Terror Indictment Against Alleged Antifa Members? (Eric Columbus, Lawfare)
The Justice Department’s tacked-on charges are just for show. The larger plan is not.
Mum’s the Word on FISA Section 702 Reauthorization (Preston Marquis, Lawfare)
Successful reforms from last year’s reauthorization may sell a clean extension in 2026.
Without a Standard for Autonomy, the U.S. Military Will Get Lost in the Fog of War (Randy Yamada and Tom Schaefer, War on the Rocks)
For the Pentagon to realize a commercial-first and more autonomous force, it must overcome a lack of clarity around how the defense industrial base defines autonomy. Some use the term when referring to facets of an augmented operator experience, others characterize it as the “end game” like Skynet from The Terminator, and sales-driven vendors eagerly add “autonomous” to anything from advanced autopilot features to fully independent systems.
As leaders in the private sector applying advanced technology to the Defense Department’s autonomy missions, we have a commercial interest in delivering autonomous capabilities to warfighters. But at this crucial stage in autonomy adoption, we believe the United States can accelerate progress by establishing shared definitions, standardizing key technical layers to enable interoperability, and building operator trust through education and early integration.
What Climate Change Will Do to America by Mid-Century (Vann R. Newkirk II, The Atlantic)
Many places may become uninhabitable. Many people may be on their own.
Kathryn Bigelow on “A House of Dynamite” and the Nuclear “Elephant in the Room” (Washington Post)
“House of Dynamite” imagines what might happen if the U.S. were targeted by a nuclear missile. Oscar-winning director Kathryn Bigelow explains why she decided to make this film at this moment.
Don’t Call It Cyber Command 2.0: Master Plan for Digital Forces Will Take Years to Implement (Martin Matishak, The Record)
The Department of Defense rolled out the final version of the latest model for how the U.S. military will build its cyber forces over the next several years, an approach that is unlikely to quell growing calls for a separate service.
The revised model — meant to help U.S. Cyber Command tackle issues that have persisted since its creation in 2010, like an inability to attract and keep top-tier talent — represents what is left over from the overhaul effort once known as “Cyber Command 2.0.”
