CRITICAL MINERALSAustralia Must Make the Most of the U.S. Critical-Minerals Pivot
For the first time in years, the US conversation on critical minerals has matured beyond broad rhetoric. What was once a generic discussion about “critical minerals” has shifted decisively to developing supply chains for specific minerals. And perhaps most importantly, the dialogue is no longer confined to government-to-government statements: it now involves dozens of mining and refining.
The signals from Washington on critical minerals are no longer ambiguous; they are decisive, strategic and aligned with Australia’s long-term interests. The issue is whether Canberra and industry can convert this momentum into concrete projects that deliver secure supply chains, new processing capacity, domestic industrial depth and worthwhile commercial returns. To do that, Australia must move at speed, locking in partnerships, prioritizing specific minerals, and supporting companies ready to diversify minerals markets. Where geoeconomically feasible, it should also build the next generation of value-added manufacturing.
For the first time in years, the US conversation on critical minerals has matured beyond broad rhetoric. What was once a generic discussion about ‘critical minerals’ has shifted decisively to developing supply chains for specific minerals—such as magnet-grade light and heavy rare earths, graphite, scandium, magnesium, manganese and vanadium. And perhaps most importantly, the dialogue is no longer confined to government-to-government statements: under the Trump administration’s renewed focus, senior officials are now engaging directly with more than 30 Australian companies across Perth, Sydney and Darwin, and operating in both Australia and the United States.
The US is an important new investor and customer in Australian minerals, adding to long-standing relationships with such trusted customers as Japan and South Korea, as well as emerging new ones, including European nations, and Australia’s minerals peer, Canada.
That shift matters. When US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Critical Minerals and Metals Joshua Kroon sits down with Australian companies—rather than diplomats, peak bodies, or government agencies—the strategic conversation changes. It becomes practical, project-focused and anchored in the fundamental economics of supply chain diversification. And it signals a structural transition: the US now views Australian companies as essential industrial partners, not merely commodity suppliers.
Yet we must be clear about what this partnership is and isn’t. From Australia’s perspective, this isn’t about trade bifurcation or choosing sides. Our interests are not framed as ‘China or the US’. They are about ‘China and the US’—ensuring diversified, resilient, high-value supply chains that reduce strategic dependence on any single market. China remains a significantly larger customer of minerals than the US and will continue to play a central role in global demand, particularly for battery minerals. But Australia’s long-term prosperity requires moving further down the value chain, capturing processing, refining and manufacturing capability that we’ve historically ceded to others. Neither Beijing nor Washington is naturally incentivized to help Canberra climb that value chain.
