NUCLEAR RISKSSmall Modular Reactors and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are widely heralded as the next major leap in civilian nuclear energy. Beneath this optimism, however, lies a growing unease within the nuclear policy community relating to the nuclear weapons proliferation and safeguards challenges that SMRs pose to the existing global nuclear governance system.
Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are widely heralded as the next major leap in civilian nuclear energy. Promising enhanced safety, modular scalability and carbon-free electricity, they are viewed as a crucial innovation for global decarbonization and energy security. However, beneath this optimism lies a growing unease within the nuclear policy community relating to the proliferation and safeguards challenges that SMRs pose to the existing global nuclear governance system, notably the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
As the race to commercialize SMRs accelerates,[1] it exposes a regulatory lag between technological innovation and institutional adaptation. Multiple countries are now competing to establish first-mover advantages in export markets, standard-setting and supply chains. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s approval of NuScale’s SMR design,[2] the United Kingdom’s advancement of Rolls-Royce SMR through the Generic Design Assessment process,[3] and Canada’s national SMR Action Plan[4] indicate a shift from research-oriented development to commercialization strategies.
Existing nuclear regulatory frameworks were designed for large, centralized reactors. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has highlighted gaps in regulatory readiness, licensing harmonization and workforce capacity with respect to SMRs.[5] Unless new norms and safeguards are developed, the proliferation of SMRs could further undermine the NPT’s credibility and create new avenues for proliferation.
SMRs and the NPT: A Structural Mismatch
SMRs, typically generating between 50 and 300 megawatts of electricity, are designed to be factory-fabricated and easily transported to deployment sites. Their small size and modular construction allow them to serve remote or off-grid regions, making nuclear energy more accessible and potentially more sustainable. Major Powers such as the United States, Russia and China are investing heavily in SMR development, while countries such as India and Canada are exploring indigenous designs.
Yet, these very characteristics like mobility, compactness and commercial flexibility also complicate non-proliferation safeguards. The technology’s promise of ‘nuclear democratization’ risks creating a world with more nuclear actors, more dispersed facilities and less transparency. The NPT, which was drafted over five decades ago, was not designed for such a landscape. The NPT is built upon three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Articles I and II prohibit the transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons and related technology, while Article III establishes the IAEA’s role in safeguarding nuclear materials used for peaceful purposes.
