CHINA WATCHMaking Hay While Trump Shines: China’s Tactical Step Back
Xi appears to have concluded that the Trump administration’s behaviour presents a strategic opportunity. The turbulence in Washington’s alliances, mixed messaging on commitments and a renewed focus on transactional diplomacy have created space for Beijing to present itself as a comparatively stable and responsible actor.
Beijing has temporarily adjusted how its military operates across the Indo-Pacific. This includes less aggressive behavior from flotillas sailing deep into the region and its military engagements inside the first island chain.
But it’s a tactical calibration, not strategic adjustment. President Xi Jinping is making the most of a geopolitical window shaped in part by Donald Trump’s return to the White House. The long-term trajectory of Chinese power projection remains unchanged.
In a parliamentary committee hearing yesterday, Defense officials confirmed that another Chinese naval task group sailed deep into the Indo-Pacific late last year, travelling into the southwest Pacific after first being detected in the Philippine Sea. Chief of the Defense Force Admiral David Johnston said the group approached Australia but stayed ‘more than 200 nautical miles’ from it. The group didn’t enter Australia’s exclusive economic zone.
That task group’s composition was notable. According to Australian Defense Force officials and satellite imagery, it included a Type 075 (Yushen-class) amphibious assault ship, China’s largest class of amphibious ship; a Renhai-class (Type 055) guided-missile cruiser, one of China’s most powerful warships; a Jiangkai-class guided-missile frigate; and a replenishment vessel. This is the first time a Type 075 has travelled so far from Chinese waters, so the formation was more capable than the one that circumnavigated Australia in early 2025.
Australian P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft detected the group on the evening of 2 December, about 500 nautical miles (900 km) north of Palau. After sailing through the Philippine Sea and in the southwest Pacific, elements of the task group were later reported as participating in large, late-December military exercises around Taiwan called Justice Mission 2025.
But why did this task group behave less aggressively from the one that sailed around Australia in February, which conducted live-fire exercises off Australia’s east coast? And why have we not seen reporting of unsafe military intercepts involving Australia or other Western militaries in the South China Sea in recent months, despite recent analysis highlighting that China’s overall military activity remains elevated?
One explanation may be that Beijing has grown more comfortable with Canberra. But there has been no discernible change in Australia’s China policy that would justify such an assumption. Australia continues to strengthen defense cooperation with the United States and Japan, pursue AUKUS and speak out on stability across the Taiwan Strait. The shift in tone is unlikely to be about Australia itself.
Instead, larger geopolitical trends are probably at play.
Xi appears
