ENCRYPTIONChip-Processing Method Could Assist Cryptography Schemes to Keep Data Secure
By enabling two chips to authenticate each other using a shared fingerprint, this technique can improve privacy and energy efficiency.
Just like each person has unique fingerprints, every CMOS chip has a distinctive “fingerprint” caused by tiny, random manufacturing variations. Engineers can leverage this unforgeable ID for authentication, to safeguard a device from attackers trying to steal private data.
But these cryptographic schemes typically require secret information about a chip’s fingerprint to be stored on a third-party server. This creates security vulnerabilities and requires additional memory and computation.
To overcome this limitation, MIT engineers developed a manufacturing method that enables secure, fingerprint-based authentication, without the need to store secret information outside the chip.
They split a specially designed chip during fabrication in such a way that each half has an identical, shared fingerprint that is unique to these two chips. Each chip can be used to directly authenticate the other. This low-cost fingerprint fabrication method is compatible with standard CMOS foundry processes and requires no special materials.
The technique could be useful in power-constrained electronic systems with non-interchangeable device pairs, like an ingestible sensor pill and its paired wearable patch that monitor gastrointestinal health conditions. Using a shared fingerprint, the pill and patch can authenticate each other without a device in between to mediate.
“The biggest advantage of this security method is that we don’t need to store any information. All the secrets will always remain safe inside the silicon. This can give a higher level of security. As long as you have this digital key, you can always unlock the door,” says Eunseok Lee, an electrical engineering and computer science (EECS) graduate student and lead author of a paper on this security method.
Lee is joined on the paper by EECS graduate students Jaehong Jung and Maitreyi Ashok; as well as co-senior authors Anantha Chandrakasan, MIT provost and the Vannevar Bush Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, and Ruonan Han, a professor of EECS and a member of the MIT Research Laboratory of Electronics. The research was recently presented at the IEEE International Solid-States Circuits Conference.
“Creation of shared encryption keys in trusted semiconductor foundries could help break the tradeoffs between being more secure and more convenient to use for protection of data transmission,” Han says. “This work, which is digital-based, is still a preliminary trial in this direction; we are exploring how more complex, analog-based secrecy can be duplicated — and only duplicated once.”
