Pick Your Poison: The Enduring Threat of Biological Toxins

Consequently, Koblentz argued that toxins can be used as “tools of mass coercion” rather than “weapons of mass destruction”. He also maintained that the rise in authoritarianism across the globe and the rapid advancements in S&T could not only lead to an increase in the demand for biological toxins but also a growth in supply.  

Koblentz, moreover, outlined current international regulations on biological toxins. He emphasized that while the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as the 1925 Geneva Protocol, prohibit the malicious use and weaponization of toxins, significant gaps persist in the treaties’ verification capabilities and the international community’s condemnation of such actions. In that regard, Koblentz criticized Russia’s evasion of noteworthy investigation and political consequences for allegations of past poisonings (such as the 2020 Novichok attack on Navalny) and the pursuit of an illegal government-run program to weaponize biological toxins. According to Koblentz, the willingness to use toxins paired with the capabilities to produce them renders Russia the greatest threat in terms of potential toxin attacks, followed by China, Iran, and North Korea in that order.  

Fanny Ewann from INTERPOL was the second panel speaker. Ewann reiterated that the threat of toxin use has been persistent and is increasing around the world. The primary threat is their use by non-state actors, including terrorist groups, individuals in homicide cases, and, more recently, actors involved in animal poisoning as a form of agroterrorism, which is currently on the rise. Ewann elaborated on several recent cases involving toxins, including last year’s potential bioterror plot in India, the ricin poisoning case in Germany in 2018, the mushroom poisoning case in Australia, and the strychnine poisoning of dogs in Spain. This evolution in the biothreat landscape has prompted INTERPOL to reassess its list of bioagents and toxins of concern for both animal and human populations, expanding the list from four to sixteen biological threats. 

Lastly, Giordano added to the discussion by elaborating on the specific characteristics that render toxins challenging to detect, attribute, and defend against. He argued that current technological advancements facilitate and increase the affordable production of toxins and that such developments allow for the creation of novel toxins that display increased stability and potency while evading detection. Additionally, Giordano maintained that the dual-use nature of toxin research allows malicious actors to access samples and the necessary infrastructure to weaponize toxins covertly. His presentation emphasized that a range of actors (e.g., state, non-state, and “do-it-yourself” communities) possess the capabilities to utilize highly potent toxins to effectively target individuals or create fear in society through random targeting. Giordano’s arguments therefore aligned with his fellow presenters as he defined toxins as “weapons of maximum disruption.”  

During the Q&A section of the panel, the main topics were the influence of AI on the weaponization of toxins and what could be done at the international level to address the threat posed by toxins. Giordano described how AI could not only be used to predict social patterns and behaviors, thereby facilitating targeting, but also enable the production of more deadly toxins that can incapacitate at lower doses than are required for detection. In response to questions from commissioners about steps that could be taken to counter this threat, the panelists called for the introduction of systems that address vulnerabilities in the food supply chain and water systems, improved inter-agency information-sharing on both the domestic and international levels, establishment of a transnational laboratory network for toxin detection, an accountability framework that facilitates attribution of malicious toxin use, and heightened penalization for the misuse of biotoxins.  

Alex Kyabarongo is a second-year MS Biodefense student from Uganda with special interests in global health security policy and biothreat reduction programs. Lena Kroepke is a recent MS Biodefense program graduate from Germany with a background in peace and conflict research. This article is published courtesy of the Pandora Report.