CHINA WATCHFar from Random, China’s Global Port Network Is Clustering Near the World’s Riskiest Trade Routes
In late February 2026, the Panamanian government took control of two ports in the Panama Canal that had been operated by a Hong Kong conglomerate for two decades. The move is the latest in a long-simmering legal battle after Panama’s high court voided the company’s contracts.
Far from just a local dispute, however, the episode has drawn in the United States and China, whose competition over global ports and trade routes has intensified in recent years, including in the crucial Panama Canal Zone, where China’s presence has repeatedly drawn the ire of the Trump administration.
Chinese firms now own or operate terminals at more than 90 ports worldwide, including many of the busiest. The network spans Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Asia, with growing activity in South America.
The scale of China’s involvement in overseas ports has fueled debate over whether these investments are purely commercial or serve broader strategic goals.
Much of that debate has relied on case studies and politicized headlines, including in the case of the Panama Canal. But understanding where these ports are located, and whether there are consistent patterns in the countries that host them, is important given that disruptions to global shipping lanes can reverberate across the world economy.
In a recent study, we – researchers in maritime security, global infrastructure and trade – built the first global database of Chinese-affiliated ports and analyzed 133 coastal countries to understand why some host Chinese port investments while others do not.
We found that China’s overseas port expansion is not random. Far from being driven primarily by general business climate measures, the investments cluster near maritime chokepoints and piracy-prone shipping corridors, with more modest evidence that resource-rich countries are also more likely to host these ports.
The Importance of Chokepoints
Some sea routes are more important than others. The Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca are examples of chokepoints – narrow routes through which large volumes of global trade and energy shipments must pass.
In our findings, countries near primary or secondary chokepoints, such as Panama or countries bordering the Dover Strait, such as France, were substantially more likely to host a Chinese-affiliated port. Put simply, proximity to critical trade bottlenecks strongly predicts Chinese investments.
This makes economic sense. China depends heavily on maritime trade to sustain economic growth. And ports near chokepoints sit along the world’s most sensitive shipping corridors and offer long-term commercial access in strategic locations.
Despite concerns in the West that Beijing is developing ports for
