WORLD ROUNDUPThe End of America’s Soft Power | The Global Scramble for Ports | Mali Is the Key to Understanding Africa’s Trajectory, and more

Published 4 May 2026

·  The End of America’s Soft Power

·  Can Donald Trump reopen the Strait of Hormuz?

·  The Global Scramble for Ports

·  This Energy Crisis Is Undoing the Last Ones

·  Mali Is the Key to Understanding Africa’s Trajectory

·  Why Lebanon Is Nonnegotiable for Iran

The End of America’s Soft Power

The United States has given up on one of its core international strengths.

Can Donald Trump Reopen the Strait of Hormuz?  (Economist)
Probably not, and he still has to deal with Iran’s uranium.

The Global Scramble for Ports  (Economist)
The investment frenzy is driven by anxiety about China’s tightening grip on supply chains.

This Energy Crisis Is Undoing the Last Ones  (Giuliana Chamedes, Foreign Policy)
The Western-led order that emerged after the 20th century’s three energy shocks is losing its grip.

Mali Is the Key to Understanding Africa’s Trajectory  (Howard W. French, Foreign Policy)
The West ignores the warning signs in the Sahel at its own peril. 

Why Lebanon Is Nonnegotiable for Iran  (Sajjad Safaei, War on the Rocks)
As American and Iranian diplomats gathered in early April in Islamabad for Pakistan‑mediated ceasefire talks to end the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran and its regional allies, including Hizballah, a sticking point emerged: whether the ceasefire was to include Lebanon. The United States and Israel initially rejected the notion that Lebanon had been part of the agreement, with President Donald Trump referring to Israeli operations there as a “separate skirmish.” Conversely, the Iranians signaled that Lebanon had been part of the agreement and threatened to unilaterally end the ceasefire if Israeli attacks continued against Lebanon.
Although the ceasefire remains fragile, with Iran continuing to exert direct control over transit through the Strait of Hormuz while U.S. naval forces try to enforce a wider blockade targeting Iranian shipping, the dispute over Lebanon’s inclusion in the agreement points to a deeper flaw in how Iran’s relationship with Hizballah is understood by many in the West. Iran’s insistence on including Lebanon in any ceasefire deal with Washington, together with Hizballah’s own participation in the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, undercuts the idea that the organization is a mere supplicant proxy of a supposedly domineering Iran.