NUCLEAR WEAPONSIran Nuclear Talks: Three Lessons from the War for Negotiators
Diplomats have gathered in New York to review the future of the global nonproliferation regime, while Washington and Tehran develop terms for a potential future meeting in Islamabad. The Iran war has surfaced three initial nuclear security lessons that should shape the deals negotiators aim to reach.
U.S. President Donald Trump was unequivocal last month when asked whether the United States would use a nuclear weapon against Iran: “A nuclear weapon should never be allowed to be used by anybody,” he said. That statement, striking in its restraint from a president who had threatened Iran with civilization-ending force, coincidentally came just before diplomats from 191 countries gathered in New York City to review the future of a treaty that has largely kept nuclear weapons from proliferating for more than 50 years.
In New York, for the eleventh time, representatives of the states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are reviewing the agreement’s fundamental bargain: few countries can possess nuclear weapons, but many can benefit from nuclear science and energy. Iran has tested the international nonproliferation system for decades as it sought and enriched nuclear materials. The U.S. president’s predecessors, sometimes with the other UN Security Council permanent five members (P5), slowed or curtailed Iran’s activities through negotiated inspections, export controls, sanctions, and even a sophisticated cyberattack on their enrichment facilities. But Trump’s seven-week war with Iran, and its unsteady ceasefire, has pursued another path to counter proliferation: military force.
The president’s gamble—that bombs can accomplish what inspectors and negotiators could not—now hangs over future ceasefire talks with Iran and the nonproliferation conference in New York. Though negotiators in both locations should aim for “better-than-nothing” deals, the paths are fraught. If Iran is unsuccessful in isolating nuclear issues from ceasefire talks and negotiators return to Islamabad for discussions, the United States could seek new limits on uranium enrichment and weaponization of Iran’s 440 kilograms of fissile material. Negotiators in New York are not expected to agree on new nonproliferation initiatives, but a formal, consensus document to reaffirm the NPT’s core bargain would be better than nothing—and more than recent Review Conferences have managed to deliver.
The outcomes of both sets of talks are far from clear. But the war itself, and its ripple effect on the NPT conference, has surfaced three critical nuclear security lessons that should guide whoever sits at either negotiating table.
