The Iran Nuclear Deal the World Deserves Takes Us Back to the Basics

This process will also satisfy current UN Security Council demands and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions on Iran, opening the door for sanctions relief, conditional on the final outcome rather than negotiated to be a step-for-step reward to keep Iran engaged in the process.  After all, the Islamic regime is still in power, and it neither wants nor needs all sanctions removed, it needs a lifeline, and it otherwise could decide it got enough at any point.  Preserving its nuclear weaponization infrastructure and personnel and its ability to make gas centrifuges has been key to that strategy. The stocks of enriched uranium have taken on special meaning in the present context but in the end, Iran will move to protect the former capabilities rather than the mere products of those capabilities. 

To start, Iran would have to provide a complete declaration and access, and dismantle, destroy or render harmless key nuclear weaponization equipment and materials, followed by the IAEA conducting an initial verification of the declaration and dismantlement.  The initial verification can be accomplished relatively quickly, and the following verification would be more thorough to ensure the absence of undeclared materials or activities. 

The first phase can occur in a matter of months, if Iran cooperates, as South Africa showed.  If Iran refuses to cooperate or only partially cooperates, an infinite amount of time is not enough, and no rewards would be given. 

The targets Israel and the United States destroyed demonstrate considerable knowledge about Iran’s nuclear weaponization program, which if shared can help the IAEA’s effort and speed it up.  In the two wars, Israel attacked and destroyed nine to twelve sites involved in developing and building nuclear weapons. Many of these sites contained elements added only in recent months or years.  At least one site held a post-June reconstituted nuclear weaponization capability that Israel somehow discovered.  In addition, Israel killed over 20 “oppenheimers” and “groves” essential to a functioning nuclear weaponization effort, eliminating important know-how in the process.

The initial phase of coming into compliance with the NPT would include a full declaration of the locations of the stocks of enriched uranium and go further, mandating their removal or down blending.  Stocks of natural uranium should be sold internationally, as unneeded.

In parallel, specific limits on the fuel cycle should be negotiated. The soundest position is that Iran commits to a pledge of no enrichment and no reprocessing for an extended period of time.  Iran has no reason beyond building nuclear weapons to do either.  Iran has not adhered to the NPT and thus cannot claim NPT privileges.  Since Iran has not met the basic demands of the NPT, it does not deserve enrichment or reprocessing.  Iranian enrichment and its means of production have been destroyed.  The war ended enrichment in Iran, something that no nuclear agreement had accomplished.  The end to enrichment is therefore a given, and its continuation does not deserve sanctions relief.  It has no ability to reprocess and all its plutonium is in irradiated fuel under international monitoring at the Bushehr nuclear power reactor and unlikely to be diverted. 

A compromise on enrichment is possible, if Iran demonstrates, concretely and verifiably, it has exclusively a peaceful nuclear program. But that compromise needs to contain a suspension long enough to matter, and any restart of Iran’s centrifuge program would require the satisfaction of a set of criteria.  The most fundamental one is a determination that the program would be economically and commercially viable. 

How long is enough?  A 20-year time period is often discussed.  It is critical that a 20-year suspension does not mean a 20-year preparation for rebuilding; the condition of a spring back was a deep flaw at the heart of the JCPOA.  There must be a halt to the current centrifuge program for its entire duration. It must mean, at the beginning of the 20 years, redirecting all employees in the centrifuge program to other areas of work, and dismantling key components and equipment of the centrifuge program under international supervision.  This is critical because without any halt, it would likely take Iran more than a decade to rebuild its enrichment capacity anyway, if not longer, given the current sanctions regime and the immense amount of imported, sensitive equipment and materials at the heart of its enrichment industry.  A new agreement should not legitimize the reconstruction of a centrifuge program during this suspension, one making no economic sense while posing a grave proliferation risk.  When the risk is gone and the economics makes sense, then Iran can recreate a centrifuge program. 

Significant sanctions relief would follow the successful completion of the initial verification of the end of Iran’s nuclear weaponization program, the verified dismantlement of its centrifuge program, and removal or downblending of enriched uranium stocks to natural uranium.  More sanctions relief would follow the successful completion of the second, more thorough IAEA verification.

Unfortunately, many are willing to make Iran’s case.  U.S. negotiators unable and unwilling to discuss details are dismissed as incompetent, although they are correct to hold the line on the latter, and the former helps them with it.  Many others continue to say that asking Iran to give up enrichment is a lot, and asking for a lot means the war will continue, when in fact, the war has destroyed so much.  What used to be a lot is now a little.   

And if Iran moves to rebuild a small enrichment plant sufficient to further enrich its 60 percent to 90 percent enriched uranium, then it is clearly moving to build nuclear weapons and inviting a resumption of military conflict, while likely still needing well over a year to build a nuclear weapon out of the weapon-grade uranium.

So, there is time to accomplish a more fundamental and pressing goal, a simple and straightforward one, with no complicated sequencing, establishing verifiably that Iran is committed to a peaceful nuclear program and, in parallel, to establish a cooling off period of at least 20 years where Iran continues its halt across its entire enrichment program.  This approach, focused fundamentally on NPT compliance, is more amenable to gathering international support and justifying further U.S. actions.

David Albright is President and Founder of the Institute for Science and International Security. Sarah Burkhard is Research Associate at the Institute for Science and International Security. Spencer Faragasso is Research Fellow at the Institute for Science and International Security. This article is published courtesy of the Institute for Science and International Security.