DIGITAL DISINFORMATIONEstimating the Effects on the UK of State Information, Influence, and Interference Threats Using Digital Disinformation, Distortion, and Deception
There is no adequate methodology or framework for estimating the impacts and effects of foreign state information, influence, and interference effects on the UK. Without such a framework it is difficult for decision-makers to prioritize which events and incidents require responding to because of the harms they are causing.
There is currently no established or agreed upon framework for measuring the impacts of foreign state information, influence and interference threats. This is despite it being a societal challenge attracting significant public and political attention. Without such a framework it is difficult for decision-makers to prioritize which events and incidents require responding to because of the harms they are causing.
This research starts to address this gap by focusing specifically upon estimating the information effects of Russian influence operations targeting the UK, and mapping some of the conceptual, methodological and empirical issues involved. Russia runs multiple different operations in parallel to one another, with different signature methodologies and targets. Focusing upon the UK, especially high-profile Russian operations seeking to elicit information effects in the UK have included:
● The Internet Research Agency’s covert accounts on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, seeking to amplify social tensions and divisions following the 2017 terror attacks in London and Manchester;
● A ‘hack and leak’ operation in the lead-up to the 2019 General Election;
● And the Social Design Agency’s persistent Doppelganger operation seeking to smear the reputations of high-profile UK figures.
In addition to understanding what effects may have been elicited by such actions and how, the second key purpose of this report is to clarify the nature of some of the key challenges and lay out the ‘building blocks’ for configuring a methodology and framework of indicators that could provide reasonably reliable and precise estimates of the prevalence and distribution of any harms being caused in the future. There are several reasons why designing and delivering such an approach is both pressing and difficult. One key contributing factor is the de-centered institutional architecture of the UK’s response to state information manipulation threats. There are at least six different government departments and agencies contributing to this effort, with different understandings responsibilities, perspectives and postures. Consequently, there is no single point of view on the scale and scope of the present threats posed to the UK, nor how these have evolved over time.
