IRAN WARThe Lesson of the Iran War May Be Staying Power, Not Firepower
Any assessment of the war between the United States and Iran must come to grips with two seemingly contradictory observations. The US definitely secured a military win and the Iranian regime perhaps emerged strategically stronger. Is the world both better off and worse off? Definitely maybe.
Any assessment of the war between the United States and Iran must come to grips with two seemingly contradictory observations. The US definitely secured a military win and the Iranian regime perhaps emerged strategically stronger. Is the world both better off and worse off? Definitely maybe.
For Australia, these contradictions shape how Canberra manages its most important ally while contending with a regime that has directed attacks on Australian soil.
Debate over who has come out more victorious is already old news. The most useful question is not which of the outcomes is worth the greatest notice but how they interact. A regime that has been materially weakened yet left politically entrenched presents a more complicated problem than either a straightforward defeat or victory would. It is that combination which will shape the next phase of the confrontation and the international order that emerges from it.
The military dimension is more straightforward. The US and Israeli campaign inflicted substantial damage on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, air defenses and command and control networks. And military weakening of Iran (in terms of its nuclear program and ability to support its terror proxies) is to the world’s benefit. The broader strategic consequences are less straightforward. The regime’s survival is, in itself, a meaningful victory for Tehran.
While the terms of the US–Iran memorandum of understanding are less clear and still in negotiation in Switzerland, we see immediate benefits for Iran: the ceasefire, the lifting of the naval blockade and the oil waivers now returning Iranian crude to market through the Strait of Hormuz. The provisions that would underwrite a durable settlement – a lasting resolution of the nuclear question, verifiable curbs on Iran’s ballistic missile program and an end to its support for regional proxies – are deferred to a final agreement, the conclusion of which is uncertain. The danger is not that the deal concedes too much to Iran in substance but that the deferred half is never delivered. Iran could pocket its immediate gains while the harder questions are left unanswered and confrontation returns.
