IRAN WARThe Danger of U.S.‑Iran Ceasefire Agreement Is What It Leaves Out
To most onlookers, the contradictions between the U.S. and Iran’s – and Israel’s — interpretations of the framework agreement may seem like confusion, bad faith or evidence that the agreement is already unraveling. But after more than two decades studying how wars end and whether the peace holds, I have learned that contradictions are often a sign the negotiations are working. The real danger lies elsewhere: in what the U.S.-Iran agreement leaves out.
The latest U.S. military conflict with Iran appears to be over.
Washington declared success. Tehran claimed victory. Israel insisted it remains free to strike Hezbollah.
Some sticking points remain. For example, Iranian officials insist de-escalation in Lebanon was part of the deal; Israeli leaders deny it.
To most onlookers, the contradictions may seem like confusion, bad faith or evidence that the agreement is already unraveling.
But after more than two decades studying how wars end and whether the peace holds, I have learned that contradictions are often a sign the negotiations are working. The real danger lies elsewhere: in what the U.S.-Iran agreement leaves out.
The Price of Caving
It would be a mistake to assume the United States and Iran are bargaining only with each other.
The political scientist Robert Putnam called diplomacy a “two-level game” in which leaders negotiate abroad and at home at once. And no deal abroad survives unless it can be sold to the audience back home.
The U.S.-Iran agreement is closer to a five-level game. Washington must satisfy Iran, Israel, Congress, its Arab partners and its European allies. Tehran must satisfy Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard, Iran’s most powerful military institution. Iran must also contain a public whose anger over sanctions can spill into the streets, and it must keep Russia and China on its side.
Every gain at the negotiating table must be sold to people who are not at the table.
That is why the messaging contradicts itself. Each side is talking past its rival to its own people. Washington calls relief from sanctions a reversible decision. Tehran stresses its sovereignty. Israel advertises its freedom to strike.
And the price of caving differs from place to place. In Washington, it might be electoral. In Tehran, factions of hard-liners may exact a heavy political price from leaders who compromise with the West, a lesson learned by President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif after the 2015 nuclear deal.
Diplomacy has always worked this way. The first recorded peace treaty, struck by Egypt and the Hittites – an ancient civilization centered in modern-day Turkey – after the battle of Kadesh 3,000 years ago, survives in two versions, each written in its own language for an audience at home.
