Exile by Agreement: Guyana and U.S. Expansion of Third-Country Deportations
A Network Larger Than “20 Countries”
The administration’s network is already substantially larger than the more-than-20-country estimate. The precise count depends on the definition: whether one counts signed agreements, public commitments, informal arrangements, or countries that have actually received a transfer. But major rights organizations tracking the policy reported by mid-August that the United States had reached arrangements with more than 35 countries and had forcibly transferred more than 23,000 people to 26 third countries since 20 January 2025.
Amnesty International’s June survey identified at least 30 countries that had concluded arrangements with the United States. It listed the following states as countries that had received or agreed to receive third-country nationals:
Africa: Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Ghana, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Uganda
Americas and Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia
Europe and Eurasia: Kosovo, Poland, Uzbekistan
This list is almost certainly incomplete. Rights groups have since identified additional agreements or country pages involving the Bahamas, Grenada, Jamaica, Moldova, and others. The administration’s lack of transparency makes an authoritative roster impossible. Human Rights First and Refugees International say that many agreements have never been made public, notwithstanding federal requirements that international agreements be disclosed to Congress.
Without published agreements, it is difficult to determine what the United States has promised receiving states, what legal status deportees are meant to have, how long they may be detained, whether they can work, whether they can seek asylum, who pays for housing and health care, or what safeguards exist against onward deportation to danger.
Guyana’s announcement is therefore unusually specific in at least one respect: it describes a temporary, IOM-administered program and says Guyana may vet the people transferred. But the case also illustrates a defining ambiguity. The six arrivals are said to be awaiting the outcome of their immigration cases in Guyana. Yet neither the available accounts nor the public description explains what durable status they can receive if neither Cuba nor Afghanistan becomes a viable destination—or whether they will have a meaningful, independent opportunity to contest removal from Guyana to another country.
The Scale: Mexico Dominates
The numbers show that the policy has two parts. The first, much larger one uses Mexico as a mass receiving country. The second, rapidly expanding part consists of direct removal flights to countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and elsewhere.
Between 20 January 2025 and 15 August 2026, researchers at Human Rights First and Refugees International counted more than 23,000 forced third-country transfers:
● Nearly 20,000 people were sent to Mexico.
● More than 2,700 were sent to other Latin American and Caribbean countries.
● More than 330 were sent to African countries.
● More than 200 were sent to countries in other regions.
The principal destination has been Mexico. Human Rights Watch used ICE removal data obtained through public-records litigation to estimate that 12,977 third-country nationals were deported to Mexico between 20 January 2025 and 9 March 2026. Its broader accounting found 18,453 third-country removals in that period, meaning that Mexico took roughly 70 percent of the total.
Cuban nationals have been among the most affected. Human Rights Watch estimated that 4,353 Cubans were deported to Mexico during the same period—by far the largest nationality group among third-country deportees there. The organization found that 27 percent had no U.S. criminal record, while many others had lived in the United States for decades, often with family and longstanding community ties.
The administration is now sending more people directly to countries far from the U.S.-Mexico border. In a ten-day period in August, three ICE flights delivered more than 100 people—including Afghans, Cubans, Nicaraguans, Iranians, Nepalis, Turks, Venezuelans, and others—to Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. None was a citizen of the country to which he or she was sent, according to CBS News reporting based on internal U.S. government documents.
The pace has accelerated. Between June and mid-August alone, the United States carried out 33 third-country removal flights to 12 countries. Those flights included first transfers to the Central African Republic, Belize, and Dominica, and repeat flights to Costa Rica, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, Ghana, Moldova, Panama, Paraguay, and Sierra Leone. Regular transfers also continued to Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.
Guyana’s six arrivals should therefore not be read as an isolated Caribbean arrangement. They are part of a deliberate expansion from the North American migration corridor into a dispersed global network of receiving states.
The Conditions: Detention, Destitution, and Legal Limbo
The most important question is what awaits deportees after the plane lands. Here, the record is uneven but deeply troubling.
In some countries, people have reportedly been detained immediately upon arrival—sometimes in conditions that advocates describe as arbitrary detention. In others, they have been released but left with little money, no formal immigration status, no access to legal assistance, and no ability to work. In still other cases, they have been transferred onward to their countries of origin despite a U.S. immigration judge having found that they faced persecution or torture there.
The pattern is not a single standardized system. It is a collection of bilateral bargains whose terms vary, often invisibly. But three recurring conditions stand out.
Detention without a Clear Endpoint
Amnesty International reports that many of the agreements result in arbitrary detention in receiving countries. The organization has documented people being sent to countries where they have no links, little legal support, and no reliable way to challenge either detention or onward removal.
In the Central African Republic, for example, people from Afghanistan, Cuba, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and elsewhere were transferred to Bangui, in a country that the U.S. State Department has warned Americans not to visit because of armed conflict, crime, and instability. Reporting from the country has described deportees with no knowledge of where they were being sent, no local support networks, no shared language, and no clear plan after temporary lodging ends.
Beyond material hardship, a person who is placed in custody or temporary accommodation in a country where they have no legal identity, no local lawyer, and no access to consular protection can become effectively invisible: removed from the U.S. legal system without being meaningfully placed within a functioning legal system elsewhere.
Release into Destitution
Mexico illustrates the second pattern: people are released rather than formally imprisoned, but the absence of status, work authorization, housing, health care, and money can produce another kind of confinement.
Human Rights Watch interviewed 53 third-country nationals deported from the United States to Mexico, including 41 Cubans. Many described being sent without documentation, money, or possessions. The organization found that some had ended up sleeping in parks or outside hospitals; older people and those with chronic illnesses reported being unable to obtain essential medications or care. Deportees often received only limited permission to remain in Mexico—generally 10 days—to initiate an asylum claim.
In theory, asylum may offer a route out of legal limbo. In practice, the system has been difficult to access. Human Rights Watch reported barriers including lack of phones and email accounts, delays, mandatory check-ins, restrictions on moving while a claim is pending, and lack of shelter or income during the process. This is particularly severe in places such as Tapachula and Villahermosa, where migrants face exposure to organized crime, extortion, trafficking, and homelessness.
For Cubans, the predicament is especially acute. Cuba has often refused to receive deportations from the United States. That means a Cuban expelled from the United States to Mexico may be unable to return to Cuba, yet unable to acquire a durable legal status in Mexico without successfully navigating an overloaded asylum process. The person is not just deported; he is suspended between countries.
Deportation by Relay
The gravest allegation concerns “chain refoulement”—the risk that a receiving country will subsequently send someone to the country from which they fled, directly or indirectly, without a meaningful assessment of danger.
The principle is already visible in Mexico. Human Rights Watch found that Hondurans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans sent from the United States to Mexico could be detained and quickly deported onward across Mexico’s southern border. It documented the case of a Honduran trans woman who had received U.S. Convention Against Torture-related protection because an immigration judge found she faced persecution in Honduras. After removal to Mexico, she was deported onward to Honduras.
Human Rights First and Refugees International have reported similar cases elsewhere. They say that many of the people sent to African countries had previously received U.S. protection against removal because of likely persecution or torture in their countries of origin. They also cite the case of a Nigerian Christian woman with withholding of removal who was deported to Ghana in July 2026 and then refouled to Nigeria within twenty-four hours, despite a U.S. immigration judge’s finding that she faced persecution there.
That is the policy’s central human-rights risk: the United States may avoid direct deportation to a dangerous homeland, yet knowingly hand someone to a country that lacks the inclination, capacity, or legal safeguards to prevent onward removal.
Guyana: Exceptional Case or Opening Move?
For now, Guyana presents itself as different. Its government says the six arrivals were noncriminal, that the program is limited and transitional, and that the IOM will administer support. Guyana also says it will not carry the housing or support costs, as CBS News reported.
Those features may make the immediate conditions for the six better than those documented in Mexico or some African receiving states. The people are reportedly not permanent residents and are not described as being detained. Yet the arrangement’s language creates its own concern. “Assisted Voluntary Return” generally implies consent, but the available reporting does not establish what choice the deportees actually had, what information they were given before transfer, whether each had counsel, or whether an immigration judge independently assessed the risks of removal to Guyana.
The distinction between voluntary relocation and coerced departure is crucial. A person facing prolonged U.S. detention, separation from family, or the threat of removal to a worse destination may nominally agree to transfer while having no meaningful alternative. Genuine voluntariness requires informed consent, independent legal advice, an ability to refuse without punishment, and access to a fair process to raise safety objections.
Guyana has also left the ultimate destination unresolved. The six may return to Cuba or Afghanistan, or be relocated elsewhere. But those are not trivial alternatives. Afghan nationals may face serious risks depending on their political, ethnic, gender, religious, or personal circumstances. Cuban nationals may confront both political repression and the practical issue that the Cuban government may not accept their return. A temporary holding arrangement can easily become a prolonged legal limbo if no country ultimately agrees to provide secure residence.
Guyana’s decision should therefore be evaluated not only by how the first six people are housed this week, but by what rights they possess months from now: Can they work? Can they rent housing? Can they receive medical care? Can they challenge removal? Can they claim asylum? Can they communicate with lawyers and family? And will Guyana guarantee it will not send them onward to a country where they face persecution or torture?
Is It Legal?
Third-country removal is not automatically prohibited. International law does not require every deportation to be directly to a person’s country of nationality. States can, in principle, transfer a noncitizen to another state if that state agrees to receive the person and if the transfer complies with due process and protection obligations.
But the legality turns on safeguards that are frequently absent from the present system.
The core rule is the principle of non-refoulement: a state must not send a person to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she faces persecution, torture, enforced disappearance, or other serious human-rights harm. The prohibition appears in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, in the Convention Against Torture, and in broader human-rights law. It applies not only to direct return to a country of danger but also to indirect transfer—sending a person to an intermediary state where there is a real risk of onward removal to persecution or torture. Amnesty International’s explanation of third-country removals and the governing legal standards emphasizes that an agreement between governments does not extinguish this duty.
For the United States, the most relevant legal obligations include:
● The Refugee Convention’s non-refoulement principle, as incorporated through the 1967 Protocol
● Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, which bars transfer where there are substantial grounds to believe a person would face torture
● U.S. statutory protections such as asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
● Constitutional and administrative-law due-process requirements, including a meaningful opportunity to challenge a proposed transfer when a person fears harm in the third country
The Supreme Court has allowed the government to remove some noncitizens to third countries under federal immigration law, including in circumstances where the third country has agreed to receive them. But this does not eliminate the requirement to assess danger. The administration cannot lawfully use a third-country transfer as a device to nullify an existing withholding-of-removal or Convention Against Torture finding, nor can it simply presume that a receiving country will protect an individual from onward deportation without an individualized inquiry.
The strongest legal objections to the current practice concern four issues:
● Inadequate notice: Advocates report that some people were not told their destination until they were already aboard an aircraft.
● Lack of individualized screening: Deportees have reportedly been sent to third countries without a hearing or meaningful chance to explain why they fear that country.
● Transfers while protection claims remain unresolved: Some people have been removed while their cases were still pending, or despite previously granted protection from removal to their home countries.
● Foreseeable onward removal: If the United States sends someone to a country likely to deport them onward to persecution or torture, the U.S. may bear responsibility for the resulting chain refoulement.
International-law obligations are therefore not satisfied by obtaining the receiving government’s consent alone. Consent from Guyana, Mexico, Ghana, Rwanda, or the Central African Republic does not answer the key legal questions: Is the individual safe there? Can that person obtain protection? Is there a real opportunity to contest removal? Will the receiving country protect the person against onward expulsion?
If the answer to those questions is no, the removal may violate both international refugee and human-rights law, even if the flight itself is formally authorized by an agreement.
What Countries of Origin Say
The response from countries of origin is uneven, in part because the policy moves people from many dozens of nationalities and in part because not every government has publicly addressed every transfer. But Cuba and Afghanistan illuminate the political stakes.
Cuba is central to the story because its reluctance to accept many nationals has been one reason the United States has searched for third-country destinations. As Human Rights Watch observes in its report on Cuban and other third-country nationals deported to Mexico, Cuban authorities have often refused to receive some deportees from the United States. In the absence of a workable return channel to Cuba, the U.S. has increasingly deported Cuban nationals to Mexico and now, in the Guyana case, elsewhere.
The Cuban government’s broader position has not been an open endorsement of third-country deportation. Human Rights Watch has urged Havana to recognize the right of Cubans to return to their own country and to ensure that Cuban consular authorities provide identity documents and consular assistance to Cubans stranded abroad. That recommendation reflects a basic legal and moral problem: a state’s nationals should not be rendered effectively stateless in practice because their own government will not accept or document them.
For Afghan nationals, the questions are more directly tied to protection. Afghanistan under Taliban rule is not a uniform risk environment; danger depends on the individual. But former government personnel, people linked to U.S. institutions, journalists, women and girls, religious minorities, LGBTQ people, and others may face acute threats. The fact that two Afghan nationals have been sent to Guyana makes the adequacy of individualized screening especially important. The available Guyanese and U.S. reporting identifies no public explanation of the men’s protection claims, their legal status in the United States, or why Guyana was considered a safe and appropriate destination for them.
The receiving governments, meanwhile, have often described the arrangements as limited, humanitarian, and cooperative. Mexico’s government has publicly resisted describing itself as a formal “third country,” saying it receives migrants for humanitarian reasons, even as large-scale returns continue. Guyana emphasizes that its program is temporary, voluntary, vetted, and IOM-administered. Such language reflects the political sensitivity of hosting people who are neither citizens nor permanent residents.
But the most important voices are often those least heard: the deportees themselves. A person moved from the United States to a country where he has no ties may have no political constituency, no voting rights, no local family, no assured legal assistance, and no government eager to assume responsibility for him. A third-country deportation is more than a technical migration-policy innovation. It redistributes responsibility for unwanted migrants to states with less leverage, and often to people with the least capacity to resist.
The Policy’s Real Purpose
The administration presents third-country removals as a practical answer to irregular migration and recalcitrant foreign governments. There is a administrative problem when a person has a final removal order but no country will accept him. But the scale and design of the current policy suggest a broader purpose: deterrence through uncertainty.
The possibility of being transferred not merely out of the United States but to an unfamiliar country across an ocean can pressure migrants to abandon asylum claims, accept “voluntary” departure, or return to places they fear. Human Rights First and Refugees International argue that the system has become a way to undermine refugee protection by making the consequences of pursuing a legal claim more terrifying and unpredictable.
This is why Guyana is illustrative of a broader trend despite the small number involved. Six deportees do not change migration patterns by themselves. But their arrival demonstrates the direction of policy: an ever-wider map of countries recruited to receive people who do not belong to them.
The test for Guyana will come later. If the six have access to legal advice, humane housing, medical care, work authorization, real protection procedures, and a durable immigration status, Guyana may avoid the worst outcomes seen elsewhere. If instead they remain in administrative limbo, unable to build lives there and vulnerable to removal onward, the country will have become another node in a system that converts deportation into statelessness by another name.
Questions That Remain
The public record still leaves major gaps. Any serious investigation should press the U.S. and Guyanese governments for answers to the following questions:
● What is the full written text of the U.S.-Guyana arrangement, and will it be published?
● What legal status do the six people have in Guyana?
● Did each person give informed and uncoerced consent to relocation?
● Were they represented by counsel before transfer?
● Did U.S. authorities conduct individualized screenings for fear of persecution, torture, trafficking, medical vulnerability, or family separation?
● Were any of the six recipients of asylum, withholding of removal, or Convention Against Torture protection in the United States?
● May they work, seek asylum, access public services, and move freely within Guyana?
● What happens if Cuba or Afghanistan will not receive them, or if they fear return there?
● Does Guyana guarantee that it will not deport anyone onward without a full protection assessment?
● What money, security cooperation, visa concessions, debt relief, investment, or other benefits accompany the agreement?
Rather than procedural details, these questions determine whether Guyana’s arrangement is a temporary humanitarian placement with real legal protections, or a new outpost in an expanding system of globalized deportation.
