Security Clearances Don’t Determine Whom a President Can Trust – They Reveal Risks the President May Not Know
Those timelines present an obvious problem: Between Election Day and inauguration, an incoming administration has roughly 11 weeks – about 77 days – to assemble the people who will immediately begin dealing with military operations, intelligence, terrorism, diplomacy and other national security issues.
Prospective Cabinet-level national security nominees can be submitted for expedited background investigations during the presidential transition, and transition personnel who need classified information can begin the clearance process before Election Day. Senior nominees are also typically given priority.
But a new White House includes hundreds of political appointees and aides who may not have been identified far enough in advance for that process to be completed. That’s why interim clearances exist: They allow necessary access while the underlying vetting proceeds. They are not, however, a substitute for it.
What Investigators Are Trying to Learn
Security investigations are not solely focused on measuring a person’s loyalty to the U.S. They are also seeking to identify vulnerabilities that could make someone susceptible to pressure, coercion or exploitation.
A person may have extensive foreign contacts because of previous work overseas. Financial difficulties may have an innocent explanation. Past misconduct can be mitigated by the passage of time or changed behavior. The clearance process generally considers the person and the circumstances as a whole. But investigators cannot evaluate something they never discover.
A president may know an aide extremely well and have complete confidence in that person’s loyalty and discretion. The president is entitled to make that judgment.
An investigator’s role is different. That security officer asks whether there is relevant information about that person that the president does not know.
What Presidential Aides Hear
During my time as executive aide to the deputy director of the CIA, I was not just preparing background memos for meetings or serving as his representative with senior agency officials; I was present for much of his working day, including formal and informal discussions.
I was aware of virtually every major agency operation and priority, sometimes simply by being in the room. Some of that information never appeared in a document I handled, but it was exceptionally sensitive and known to very few people.
Foreign intelligence services do not need an aide to carry classified files out of the West Wing to gain something useful. Access to the president’s informational environment can itself be a valuable target. That is why the issue of an uncompleted investigation is broader than whether someone improperly opened a classified file. For someone operating within the president’s immediate circle, an undiscovered vulnerability can carry significantly greater consequences.
Balancing Access and Security
The slow clearance process is itself a security problem. A new administration cannot reasonably leave important White House positions vacant for six or seven months while investigations are completed. Interim access recognizes that reality. But there is a difference between accepting a known security risk and choosing not to determine what that risk might be.
For most government employees, that choice is constrained by a system of investigations, adjudications and access requirements. The president occupies a different position. Their constitutional authority over classified information gives them considerable latitude over access, particularly among their own White House staff.
That makes the investigation more important, not less. Once it is complete, a president can decide that whatever concerns the investigation uncovered are outweighed by their confidence in an aide.
But without an investigation, they are not overriding a security judgment; they are making the decision without one.
Brian O’Neill is Professor of Practice, International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology. This article is published courtesy of The Conversation.
