TERRORISMHistory of Hype and the Possibility of a Dystopian Future

By Peter Bergen

Published 7 October 2026

After 9/11, the Bush administration was preoccupied by the possibility of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), so much so that the United States went to war in Iraq. In fact, in the post-9/11 era, terrorists only experimented with crude WMD of low lethality. However, now that we are in the age of AI, are we on the threshold of a dystopian reality?

Abstract: After 9/11, the Bush administration was preoccupied by the possibility of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), so much so that the United States went to war in Iraq. In fact, in the post-9/11 era, terrorists only experimented with crude WMD of low lethality. However, now that we are in the age of AI and synthetic biology, terrorists—who are often well educated—will likely be able to create pathogens in a manner that was not available to militants of an earlier era. This feels like a dystopian reality rather than politicized hype, because it is AI industry leaders, not politicians, who are sounding the alarm about the issue.

***

The United States went to war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in March 2003 based on the false assertions of dodgy defectors and the faulty assumptions of U.S. policymakers that the Iraqi dictator had weapons of mass destruction that he might give to his allies in al-Qa`ida. None of this was true, but the subsequent invasion of Iraq and Iraqi civil war claimed the lives of some 200,000 Iraqi civilians1 and those of 4,418 American service members,2 and in the process greatly damaged global perceptions of American power and undermined faith in the U.S. government at home.

This article will not rehash any of this well-documented history but instead will attempt to explain why senior Bush administration officials became preoccupied with the idea of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) following the 9/11 attacks. The article will then examine the history of how terrorists experimented with WMD, producing only relatively crude weapons in the two decades that followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq despite much of the hyperbole surrounding the issue. It will then try to answer two pressing questions: Do advances in the fields of genetic editing and artificial intelligence change the game, so that what was once a fanciful notion—that terrorists might kill very large numbers of people with WMD—could become a bleak future reality? Does the history of hype about terrorists deploying WMD hold lessons that might be applicable today?