ARGUMENT: DHS & BIODEFENSEReforming DHS’s Biodefense Operations and Governance

Published 25 May 2022

Today’s biological threats show no signs of desisting any time soon. Naturally occurring outbreaks, epidemics and pandemics, and laboratory accidents pose a growing challenge – while the number of high-containment laboratories and amount of dangerous research continues to increase unabated. “DHS, as chief among those federal departments and agencies responsible for securing the homeland, must overcome its current state of fractionation and demonstrate to the rest of the government, country, and world that it is capable of coordinating and leading efforts in biodefense and other arenas,” Carrie Cordero and Asha M. George write.

The present moment is ripe to reform biodefense efforts concerning homeland security. Carrie Cordero and Asha M. George write in Lawfare that, first, the coronavirus pandemic and the war in Ukraine demonstrate both the actual harms and potentially devastating consequences of biological events. The sluggish initial U.S. response to the pandemic revealed the inadequacy of detection and mitigation measures embedded in federal government policies and practices.

Second, as a practical matter, despite political rhetoric surrounding border security and immigration issues, the 117th Congress is invested and engaged—often in a bipartisan manner—in efforts to improve homeland security and reform the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Cordero and George write that these congressional efforts

should include among these efforts attention to DHS’s role in biodefense. Biological threats can present naturally, accidentally or intentionally. In February, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a hearing on Addressing Gaps in America’s Biosecurity Preparedness. All but one of the operational agencies within DHS carry some biodefense responsibilities…. Unfortunately, these many contributions to national biodefense are neither coordinated nor overseen to ensure effectiveness and efficiency across the department.

Unfortunately, these many contributions to national biodefense are neither coordinated nor overseen to ensure effectiveness and efficiency across the department. 

….

GAOand the commission further reported that Biodetection for the 21st Century (BD21), the department’s acquisition program launched in 2018 to replace BioWatch, has yet to obtain new technology. Leadership in the department itself has been so dismayed that they have paused the BD21 program numerous times.

Cordero and George conclude:

Today’s biological threats show no signs of desisting any time soon. Naturally occurring outbreaks, epidemics and pandemics are occurring at an increasing rate(with COVID-19 and avian influenza currently occurring simultaneously here in the United States) and deaths due to COVID-19 reaching 1 millionin the United States in just over two years. Laboratory accidents continue to occur in the United States and throughout the world, while the number of high-containment laboratoriesand amount of dangerous research continues to increase unabated. The U.S. Department of State reportedin 2021 that Russiaand North Koreapossess active offensive biological weapons programs. Chinaand Iranmay not be far behind, although definitive recent assessments are difficult to come by. Terrorist organizationscontinue to seek biological agents and weapons and have in the past encouraged their membersto use them to terrorize, sicken and kill those they consider enemies. DHS, as chief among those federal departments and agencies responsible for securing the homeland, must overcome its current state of fractionation and demonstrate to the rest of the government, country, and world that it is capable of coordinating and leading efforts in biodefense and other arenas. By acting on the recommendations above, Congress can provide the pathway to do so.