SUPERSOLDIERSPlagues, Cyborgs, and Supersoldiers: The Human Domain of War

A complex, high-threat landscape is emerging in which future wars might be fought with humans controlling hyper-sophisticated machines with their thoughts; the military-industrial base is disturbed by synthetically generated, genomically targeted plagues; and the future warfighter goes beyond the baseline genome to become an enhanced warfighter who is capable of survival in the harshest of combat environments.

The authors of a new report from the RAND Corporation examine the existing and potential future uses of biotechnology in warfare and battle and look at the human body as a warfighting domain. They envision a future in which biotechnology is used by both state and nonstate actors to affect warfighting. Sophisticated future actors may use pathogens, brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), genomic enhancements, and wearable technology to supplement and strengthen warfighters.

Key Findings

·  Several countries have advantages—when compared with the United States—in their abilities to deal with the effects of a globally released, person-to-person transmissible bioweapon.

·  State actors are more likely to use person-to-person transmissible bioweapons than they are to use nontransmissible ones because it is inherently difficult to identify the natural or artificial origins of person-to-person transmissible pathogens.

·  Internet of Bodies (IoB) technology will continue to advance, and the United States must be especially cognizant that any deployed technology can also be hacked.

·  Genomic surveillance is the most likely near-term technology to affect warfighting, but genomic enhancement could have profound consequences should it become more feasible technically.

·  State actors may find the inherent ambiguity of origins for person-to-person transmissible pathogens to be a strategic asset.

Recommendations

·  Governments should revise the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) to include strong protections, such as independent monitoring of biosafety level (BSL)–rated laboratories in a manner akin to chemical and nuclear weapons treaties. Failing BWC revisions, the United States should pursue stronger bilateral agreements for biosafety.

·  Governments should continue scrutinizing adversary biotechnology advancements to identify and publicize BWC violations.

·  Members of Congress should resist anti-vaccine populism that is at the expense of military readiness.

·  The U.S. government should continue to be vigilant about entities that misuse biotechnologies and should continue working to enhance the information security of IoB devices.

·  Stakeholders should focus the allocation of funding on projects to identify and manage risks and opportunities arising from genomic surveillance.

·  DoD should develop clear guidance on integrating biological warfighting capabilities.

·  DoD should develop warfighting conventions on the use of IoB devices, particularly BCIs.

·  DoD should develop ways to employ genomic surveillance for improvements in military personnel selection or assignments.

·  Stakeholders should research mitigation strategies for novel pathogen potentialities to anticipate and counter adversary biotechnology threats.