However dramatic it appeared, the collapse of the Afghan government and military was not surprising. The seeds of defeat were planted long before President Joe Biden ordered the withdrawal. The American project was not based in a clear understanding of the realities of Afghanistan. Well-meaning Americans believed that they could persuade, cajole, or force a project that much of the population did not actively embrace or participate in. A chain of discrete policy errors flowed from this basic failure to adequately understand the country.

A Senate panel released a new report detailing the results of an investigation examining intelligence failures by the FBI and DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) in the lead-up to the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. The investigation found that intelligence failures and operational missteps by the FBI and DHS I&A contributed to the security planning failures that left frontline officers unprepared for the violent mob that breached the Capitol and disrupted the peaceful transfer of power.

As anticipated for several years, an increasing number of Indonesian prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offences are now completing their prison terms. For Indonesian authorities, this represents a particularly prickly policy challenge. At the center of this challenge is the need for a greater understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of Indonesia’s deradicalization program and post-sentence risk assessments. The success of these programs will determine the future security of Southeast Asia.

There is a sense among senior U.S. counterterrorism officials that the actions of a handful of Americans are helping to drive the growth of racist and far-right extremist groups around the world. Specifically, these officials point to mass shootings and other high-profile attacks in the United States, which have helped to turn the perpetrators into martyrs for like-minded groups and individuals.

Support among military veterans for extremist groups and extremist ideals appears similar to or less than levels seen among the U.S. public in general, despite fears that it could be higher, according to a new RAND report. The U.S. military and veteran service organizations should continue to explore what drives some active-duty personnel and veterans to endorse extremist beliefs and join extremist causes.

While tech companies, politics, and civil society continue to discuss how to regulate social networks, a new age of the internet is dawning: the Web3. Julia Handle and Louis Jarvers write that with the technological advancements of Web3, it is critical to examine their application to extremism.

Simmering grievances, political divides, a steady proliferation of online neo-Nazi propaganda, and the approach of the 2024 presidential election are keeping the United States stuck in a “heightened threat environment,” according to the latest warning from DHS.

How do Violent nonstate actors (VNSA) finance their operations, and what do they use this financing for? What kinetic and nonkinetic counter–threat financing (CTF) methods have been successful in disrupting this financing and why? Which CTF methods have been counterproductive and why? How can the U.S. Army support efforts to disrupt VNSA financing?

Not all nonprofits are principled or embrace missions everyone considers worthy of the tax-exempt status that the government grants some 2 million organizations. A large part of the strength of the nonprofit sector lies in its diversity of causes and viewpoints, and therefore it’s better for the government to err on the side of authorizing too many tax-exempt organizations than to quash free speech. But it should be clear that charities that encourage violence and cheer on extremism are not contributing to society with any of the purposes the IRS allows.