• NUCLEAR WEAPONSNuclear Weapons: The Global Outlook in An Unstable New Era

    By Jane Hardy

    The stalled US–Iran negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program and President Donald Trump’s announcement of a US-Saudi nuclear agreement have put nuclear weapons back in the spotlight. But the threat of nuclear breakout has been growing for several decades.

  • NUCLEAR STRATEGYThe Risks of Getting Russian and Chinese Nuclear Strategy Wrong

    By Fiona Cunningham and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard

    Nuclear weapons first-use is an anxiety-inducing topic for policymakers. The possibility of nuclear weapons first-use influences diplomacy, the use of conventional force, and theories of deterrence. In this article, two scholars warn of the danger of misperception regarding first use of nuclear weapons and identify ways that major powers might—but often won’t—use nuclear weapons first.

  • MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR RISKSWhat to Make of the New Proposed U.S./Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

    By David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso

    When the full details come out, we should watch closely for adequate guardrails, loopholes, any indications that enrichment technology may be transferred to Saudi Arabia, to be able to answer the key question about whether, on balance, this agreement prevents nuclear proliferation or encourages it.

  • MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR RISKSU.S.‑Saudi Nuclear Deal Invites Proliferation Risks … Unless Safeguards Are Written In

    By Amy McAuliffe

    The most effective way to reduce the regional proliferation risk of the deal is prohibiting indigenous Saudi uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Should the U.S. allow enrichment, implementing a black box facility and stringent IAEA safeguards would mitigate any risk of Riyadh gaining expertise for a future nuclear weapons program.

  • IRAN NUKESWhat to Know About Pickaxe Mountain

    By David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, and the Good ISIS Team

    Construction of the Pickaxe mountain facility started in the fall of 2020, and at the time Iran announced that the underground halls were intended to replace the destroyed above-ground advanced centrifuge assembly facility at the main Natanz site. The destroyed site was designed to assemble about 6000 advanced centrifuges per year, a large capacity, sized to produce the tens of thousands of advanced centrifuges during and after the phasing out of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action limits from 2025 through 2030.

  • NUCLEAR WESPONSTrump’s U.S.‑Iran Ceasefire Deal Is a Costly Return to Prewar Conditions – and Resolving Nuclear Questions Will Run into the ‘Indivisibility Problem’

    By Farah N. Jan

    The Iran war was always likely to end not in a clean settlement but in a series of contested pauses. The deal to be signed on June 19 is the first of them. Iran emerges with its enrichment knowledge intact, its stockpile buried and fresh reason to believe that only a nuclear weapon would have deterred the U.S.-Israel attack.

  • NUCLEAR WEAPONSThe Complications That China’s Build-Up Brings to Nuclear Balance

    By Paul Dibb

    Any talks between the U.S. and Russia over renewing the expired nuclear arms agreement must soon include China as a nuclear superpower. Other aspects of the global nuclear arms landscape are not getting any simpler, either.

  • IRAN NUKESThe Iran Nuclear Deal the World Deserves Takes Us Back to the Basics

    By David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso

    The current nuclear negotiations on Iran need to reflect Iran’s requirement to demonstrate it does not have a nuclear weapons program and secondarily on eliminating the means to enrich uranium and the existing stocks of enriched uranium.

  • NUCLEAR WEAPONSIran Nuclear Talks: Three Lessons from the War for Negotiators

    By Erin D. Dumbacher

    Diplomats have gathered in New York to review the future of the global nonproliferation regime, while Washington and Tehran develop terms for a potential future meeting in Islamabad. The Iran war has surfaced three initial nuclear security lessons that should shape the deals negotiators aim to reach.

  • NUCLEAR DETERRENCESandia Accelerates AI Innovation for Nuclear Deterrence

    By Kenny Vigil

    Not taking a risk is a risk. That’s one message from a two-day summit at Sandia focused on artificial intelligence that emphasized its value for nuclear deterrence.

  • NUCLEAR WEAPONSThe Unravelling of the Global Nuclear Order

    While the NPT is experiencing a credibility crisis, the future of the CTBT hangs in the balance. The expiry of the New START on 5 February 2026 marked the end of the arms control era. The nuclear taboo regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons is fast diminishing due to explicit nuclear threats by world leaders. The infusion of AI into nuclear decision-making, meanwhile, is likely to affect strategic stability.

  • NUCLEAR WEAPONSThe U.S. Is Pushing Southeast Asia Toward China. The Iran War Made It Worse.

    By Joshua Kurlantzick

    There is a growing anxiety among U.S. allies in Southeast Asia about inconsistencies in U.S. policy and the credibility of long-term commitments under Trump’s leadership. A new survey of Southeast Asian opinion leaders shows they prefer China to the United States as a partner, while the region’s biggest geopolitical concern is U.S. global leadership.

  • IRAN NUKESAssessment of Blue Barrels Moved into Esfahan Mountain in Days Before June 2025 War

    By David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, and the Good ISIS Team

    Le Monde brought to our attention a June 9, 2025, a commercial satellite image taken just four days before the start of the June War. Given the overall appearance of the activity in the image, it appears to us that, of the options considered, the best match is that the blue barrels or casks contain 60 percent enriched uranium enroute to protective storage within the tunnel complex, irrespective of Iranian intent regarding its overhead observation.

  • NUCLEAR WEAPONSGoing Nuclear? Why a Growing Number of Washington’s Allies Are Eyeing an Alternative to U.S. Umbrella

    By Amy McAuliffe

    Until just a few years ago, few would have predicted that Canada, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and other nations – all allies of Washington – might one day join the nuclear club. The U.S. nuclear umbrella has, for decades, offered U.S. allies an easy way of declining to pursue nuclear weapons. But the policies of the first and second Trump administrations damaged U.S. credibility as a reliable, steadfast ally, leading these nations to consider developing domestic nuclear weapons programs.

  • IRAN WARIran’s Nuclear Materials and Equipment Remain a Danger in an Active War Zone

    By Matthew Bunn

    Before launching his war on Iran, President Donald Trump said his most important goal was that Iran would “never have a nuclear weapon.” Yet it is not clear what, if anything, his administration has planned for dealing with Iran’s stock of enriched uranium that could be used to make nuclear bombs – or its remaining deeply buried nuclear facilities and the nuclear equipment that might be in them, or hidden elsewhere.